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“Engaging military in post war reconciliation: A case study of implications for the 
consolidation of democracy in Sri Lanka” was prompted by post-war developments in Sri 
Lanka related to Civil-Military relations. The longest fought civil war in South East Asia, 
came to an end when the Sri Lankan Armed Forces successfully defeated the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militarily in May 2009.  
The huge success achieved by the Sri Lankan military vis-à-vis the Tamil Tigers 
has made the government rely on the country’s military even after the defeat of the 
LTTE. In that background, the government has encouraged military presence in all 
possible areas of the driving mechanism of the country. Specifically, the government has 
engaged the military in many activities of national development and reconciliation and in 
this scenario, there are many questions raised against the government of Sri Lanka and 
the military. Is excessive military involvement in civilian work leading to enhanced 
military prerogatives of Sri Lanka’s Armed Forces, which in turn is jeopardizing civilian 
supremacy over the armed forces? Is involvement of the military in activities of national 
development and reconciliation endangering or boosting democratic consolidation in Sri 
Lanka?  
Some critiques argue that Sri Lanka has undergone an excessive militarization, 
which is hindering post-war democratic consolidation. In this context, this research will 
look at Civil-Military relations adopted by the Sri Lankan government after the civil-war 
period from the perspective of the military prerogatives highlighted by Alfred Stepan and 
will further seek to identify the impact of CMR on the consolidation of democracy in the 
dilemma of militarization. It will start with a discussion of relevant theories of democratic 
transition and consolidation of CMR, followed by a discussion of democratic transition 
and consolidation in Sri Lanka, CMR during and after the civil war, and how CMR 
impacted democratic consolidation. The thesis finishes with an examination of lessons 
learned and best/worst practices of CMR. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The selection of the topic “Engaging military in post war reconciliation: A case 
study of implications for the consolidation of democracy in Sri Lanka” was prompted by 
post-war developments in Sri Lanka related to civil-military1 relations, based on many 
debates engaged in by various interested parties locally and internationally. Sri Lanka 
was considered a vibrant and upcoming democracy2 among the developing nations in 
Southeast Asia a few decades ago.  
The conflict between the Tamil separatist terrorists3 and the Sri Lankan 
government, which developed in the 1980s, however, later turned into a full-fledged civil 
war in 1983. The war ravaged the country for almost three decades, transforming the 
                                                 
1 Peter D. Fever in a an article published in “Annual Review on Political Science,” describes civil-
military relations as one of the truly interdisciplinary fields of study in social science, and as a broad 
subject that encompasses the entire range of relationship between the military and the civilian society. The 
field largely focuses on control or direction of the military by the civilian supremacy in nation states. 
Thomas C. Bruneau highlights in his book Who Guards the Guardians and How that the importance of 
civil-military relations came in to be recognized with the so- called third wave of democratization in the 
Portuguese upheaval, began in 1974. In addition, Bruneau and Matei expound the field of CMR in their 
paper ‘Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations’ to include more 
than civilian control of the armed forces. They consider CMR a trinity of democratic civilian control, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of the security forces.  
2 David Dunham and Sisira Jayasooriya claims that Sri Lanka was seen to be a stable, even vibrant 
parliamentary democracy and “An oasis of peace and stability” in an otherwise turbulent region. David 
Dunham and Sisira Jayasooriya, “Equity, Growth and Insurrection: Liberalization and the Welfare Debate 
in Contemporary Sri Lanka,” Oxford Development Studies Vol 28, No-I, 2000. accessed on July 22, 2012, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713688305.  
3 The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has categorized the Tamil Tigers as one of 
the most deadly extremist terrorist organizations in the world. As per the FBI, for more than three decades 
the group has launched a campaign of violence and bloodshed in Sri Lanka. It has launched suicide attacks, 
assassinated politicians (including two heads of state), and committed all of kinds of crimes to finance its 
operations. The resulting civil war has taken the lives of nearly 100,000 Sri Lankans on both sides of the 
conflict since 1983 alone. The ruthless tactics of the Tamil Tigers have inspired terrorist networks 
worldwide, including Al-Qaeda. “Taming the Tamil Tigers: From Here in the U.S.” FBI Report, accessed 
July 19, 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008/.  
 2
democratic republic into nearly a failed state4 by 2008. The armed conflict, which was the 
longest fought civil war in Southeast Asia, came to an end when the Sri Lankan Armed 
Forces successfully defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militarily in 
May 2009. The successive governments in Sri Lanka since the 1980s had taken various 
measures such as military action and negotiation to suppress the LTTE, which had gained 
control of a considerable area of the north and the east of the island (the Districts of 
Jaffna, Killinochchi, Mannar, Mulathivu, Trincomalee, Baticaloa and Amparai). All 
previous governments since the 1980s had failed, however, and the present government 
(2006 to date) adopted a different approach in civil-military relations that enhanced 
professionalization of the military. This different approach, in turn, succeeded in 
defeating the LTTE comprehensively and winning the war.  
The huge success achieved by the Sri Lankan military vis-à-vis the Tamil Tigers 
has made the government rely on the country’s military even after the defeat of the LTTE 
and adopt a militaristic approach in post-war reconciliation activities in the country. With 
that background, the government has encouraged military presence in all possible areas 
of the driving mechanism of the country. Specifically, the government has engaged the 
military in many activities of national development and reconciliation, such as 
reconstruction of housing and amenities, reactivation of farm lands, restoration of roads 
and irrigation projects, reconstruction of railway lines, restoration of civil administration, 
tourism promotion, and the like.  
                                                 
4 Weakness is endemic in many developing nations—the halfway house between strength and failure. 
Some weak states, such as Chad and Kyrgyzstan (and even once-mighty Russia), exhibit several of the 
defining characteristics of failed states and yet do not fail. Others, such as Zimbabwe, may slide rapidly 
from comparative strength to the very edge of failure. A few, such as Sri Lanka and Colombia, may suffer 
from vicious, enduring civil wars without ever failing, while remaining weak and susceptible to failure. 
Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed State in a World of Terror,” Council of Foreign Relations Vol 81, No.4 (Jul-Aug 
2002) 127–140. Accessed August 20, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20033245.pdf.  
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Within this scenario, there are many questions raised against the government of 
Sri Lanka and the military: Is this excessive5 military involvement in civilian work 
leading to enhanced military prerogatives6 for Sri Lanka’s Armed Forces? Will the 
prerogatives in turn jeopardize civilian supremacy over the armed forces? Is involvement 
of the military in activities of national development and reconciliation endangering or 
boosting democratic consolidation in Sri Lanka? 
                                                 
5 Commander of the Sri Lankan Army General J. Jayasooriya says, “Like any other army we were 
engaged in post—conflict action to help the government machinery to restore everything back to normal. 
We are glad to say we have done that in three years. Reconstruction work we do is beyond civilian 
capacity. We do it faster and I am sure people appreciate it.” (The Sri Lanka Army is heavily involved in 
post—war reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement efforts in the North and East where thousands of 
civilians were displaced due to heavy fighting between government forces and the Tamil Tigers). J. 
Jayasooriya, “Sri Lanka Army role in North is Minimal: Army Chief,” IRIB World Service Radio, accessed 
on September 12, 2012, http://english.irib.ir/subcontinent/news/regional/item/83780-sri-lanka-army-role-
in-north-is-minimal-army-chief.  
6 Alfred Stepan describes military prerogatives as an assumption of the military that they have an 
acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise control over its internal governance, to play a 
role within extra—military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the 
political or civil society. Further, Stephan views that militaries in most new democracies have such 
tendencies that might threaten democratic regimes. Stepan lists 11 prerogatives, and the Sri Lankan 
Military remains in the lower range of this influence in comparison to the criteria laid down. Peripheral 
studies indicate that only three of the listed prerogatives (coordination of the defense sector, role of senior 
career civil servants or civilian political appointees, role in state enterprise) have some effect on civilian 
control in Sri Lanka. In addition Thomas C. Bruneau, Tyrell Mayfield, Kelvin Maccaskey, Florina 
Cristiana Matei and Jason Weece in their analytical paper written on the role of the military in the 
contemporary politics of Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, use a slightly modified version of Stepan’s 11 
prerogatives. While dropping three of them, they introduce a new prerogative called ‘role in domestic 
security’ and adopt a nine prerogative model to analyze the dynamic evolution of main features of control 
in CMR in those countries. See Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Sothern Cone 
(United Kingdom: Princeton Press, 1988), 93–127; Thomas C. Bruneau et al., Civil-Military Relations in 
Democratic Transitions: The Cases of Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, (Unpublished manuscript.)    
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Some critiques argue that Sri Lanka has undergone an excessive militarization, 
which is hindering post-war democratic consolidation.7 In this context, this thesis will 
look at civil-military relations adopted by the Sri Lankan government after the civil-war 
period from the perspective of the military prerogatives highlighted by Alfred Stepan and 
will seek further to identify the impact of CMR on the consolidation of democracy in the 
dilemma of militarization. As per  Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, consolidation of a 
democracy requires at least five interacting conditions to exist. Those conditions are: 
development of a free and lively civil society, a relatively valued political society, and 
availability of a state bureaucracy.8 Against this backdrop, the thesis will start with a 
discussion of relevant theories of democratic transition, consolidation, and CMR. These 
will be followed by a discussion of democratic consolidation in Sri Lanka, CMR during 
and after the civil war, and impact of CMR on democratic consolidation in Sri Lanka. 
The thesis will conclude with an examination of lessons learned and best and worst 
practices of CMR in the Sri Lankan context.  
In terms of the preceding discussion, this paper attempts to answer the following 
research question: Does the heavy presence of the Sri Lanka military in post-war 
reconciliation activities have any impact (negative or positive) on civil-military relations 
and the consolidation of democracy in Sri Lanka? 
                                                 
7 According to Tisaranee Gunasekara, militarization of post-war Sri Lanka has continued unabated. 
Post-war, the armed forces are everywhere, doing everything. Plans are afoot to institutionalize and 
intensify this militarization of civilian spaces by garrisoning every district and inducting the armed forces 
into development work. This rapid encroachment on civilian spaces by the military is symbolized in the 
recasting of the Defense Ministry as the Defense and Urban Development Ministry. As per Rahul Bedi, Sri 
Lanka is South Asia’s most militarized country with 8000 defense personnel for every one million citizens. 
After defeating the Tamil Tiger guerrillas in May 2009, the country opted to involve its bloated military in 
a range of commercial activities. Instead of downsizing its 300,000—strong defense forces after the bitter 
civil war ended, President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s administration encouraged their involvement in various 
commercial and other activities. Disturbingly, the island’s Education Ministry plans on sending fresh 
graduates to military camps for three-week leadership courses where they will be given instruction in 
English, leadership skills and social etiquette. The analysts and NGO’s warn that it is a move fraught with 
‘militarizing the seat of Sri Lanka’s higher education.’ See “Militarization and Law Lessness,” Colombo: 
Sri Lanka Guardian. accessed on May 06, 2012. http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2012/05/militarization-
and-law lessness.html; “Armed, Dangerous and Building their Own Empires.” UK Tamilnet, accessed on 
July 02, 2012, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10746321.  
8 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post- Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), 7.  
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B. IMPORTANCE  
There are at least three reasons why this study is relevant. First, it will provide 
some lessons learned, as well as best/worst practices of civil-military relations for other 
countries undergoing conflict, while striving to become democratic, can follow. Even 
though the government of Sri Lanka has successfully met the challenge of overcoming a 
ruthless terrorist outfit, in the post-war scenario leaving an opportunity for the military to 
enhance its prerogatives may erode democratic consolidation. In that context, the study 
will highlight the potential dangers involved in the Sri Lankan issue that the government 
should be concerned about.  
Second, this study will complement the emerging, yet scarce literature of CMR in 
developing democracies. Although there are many scholarly works on CMR in developed 
democracies—and even some literature on CMR in new democracies in Latin America 
and Central and Eastern Europe—there is much less literature on CMR in Asia. 
Furthermore, the case of Sri Lanka complements the literature on CMR related to a 
democracy consolidating after a civil war, rather than in a country transforming from 
dictatorship to a democracy. This study would provide an alternate experience.  
Third, this research can assist policy makers and representatives of security 
institutions in developed democracies, especially for those who are interested in learning 
what challenges to democratic consolidation and civil-military relations emerging 
democracies have to overcome. For example, this study may be useful to civilian and 
military elites in the United States, due to the growing interest in strengthening security 
and stability of friendly nations in the Indian Ocean region.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis I – The exaggerated role played by the Armed Forces of Sri 
Lanka in reconciliation activities, inspired by their military victory over 
the LTTE, may influence democratic governance, erode civil-military 
relations, leading to the militarization of the country, and affecting the 
consolidation of democracy in post-war Sri Lanka.  
Hypothesis II – Having won the battle against the LTTE, may motivate 
and inspire the Armed Forces of Sri Lanka to be more patriotic and 
committed to the rule of law, strengthening the relationship between the 
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military and the government. It may further ensure civilian supremacy9 
over the armed forces more than ever before, as the armed forces become 
the driving factor ensuring Sri Lanka’s post-war reconciliation.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is abundant scholarly work on democracies and civil–military relations. 
First, there is literature on democratic transition, consolidation, and military intervention. 
For example, scholars such as Adam Przeworski, Guillermo O’Donnell, Juan J. Linz, and 
Alfred Stepan argue that the fall of dictatorship, or the end of authoritarian regimes can 
lead to democratic transition and consolidation. However, the validity of this argument 
may not be appropriate in the present context as many countries have transitioned and 
become consolidating or consolidated democracies even though they were not 
authoritarian regimes. For example, countries like Sri Lanka, used to be a British colony 
but transformed to a democracy with the declaration of independence in 1948. Juan J. 
Linz and Alfred Stepan define consolidation of democracy as a political situation in 
which the democracy has become the only game in town.10 Giuseppe di Palma relates 
democracy to a game, and views consolidation of democracy as the establishment of rules 
of the game that can prevent important players from proscribing the game.11 Guillermo 
O’Donnell suggests dividing the transition to democracy into two phases. The first phase 
is the process from the authoritarian regime up to the establishment of a democracy, and 
the second phase is the process from that democratic government to the consolidation of a 
democracy (COD).12 Nevertheless, although the above-mentioned luminaries in the field 
of democratic transition and consolidation have made valuable attempts to introduce 
well-founded definitions for transition and consolidation of democracy, they do not 
                                                 
9 Samuel E. Finer claims that, for the military to intervene, the military must also absorb the principle 
of supremacy of civil power. In this context, the most convenient definition is, both formally and 
effectively, that the major politics and programs of the government … should be decided by the nation’s 
politically responsible civilian leaders. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on the Horseback: Role of the Military in 
Politics (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 28.  
10 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation, 5.  
11 Giuseppe di Palma believes consolidation to be the establishing of rules of the competition able to 
prevent the key players from boycotting the game. Narcis Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic 
Reform of the Armed Forces (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 12.  
12 Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 251.  
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incorporate the military as an important determinant factor. However, the idea and model 
presented by the aforesaid scholars may be useful in initiating the study on Sri Lanka, a 
country that is presently undergoing a period of post war reconciliation that may have 
profound effects of the military on consolidation of democracy.  
Phillippe C. Schmitter has a different perception on democratic consolidation. He 
argues that democracies are never supposed to be consolidated. Different regimes should 
have the potential to adopt continuous changes that may require self-transformation to 
effect changes to their structures and rules.13 He further maintains that consolidation is 
not simply a continuation of transition from authoritarian regime—it is a combination of 
processes such as new actors, new processes, new values and resources—and he 
discusses the relevance of the military in consolidation of democracy under “Negotiation 
of a Military Pact” and “Submission of Military to Civilian Control”14 (refer to figures I 
and III). These are valuable insights that can be utilized for analysis of the situation in Sri 
Lanka too.15 Alfred Stepan links military prerogatives to democratic civilian control, and 
democratic consolidation to crises that may occur at any time, even in a consolidated 
democracy, due to civil-military contestation.16 It is Narcis Serra who clearly advocates 
that, in order to consolidate a democracy, it is necessary to include the armed forces as an 
important variable.17 Specifically, Serra believes that the military can undermine the 
process of transition and the consolidation of democracy of a country, especially in a 
                                                 
13 Phillippe C. Schmitter describes that democracy is never supposed to be consolidated. Geoffrey 
Pridham, Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe (Dartmouth: University of Bristol- Centre For Mediterranean Studies, 1995), 536–537. 
14 Ibid., 541–564.  
15 Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, ed., Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic 
Civil Military Relations (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 2. 
16 Alfred Stepan introduces the Military–contestation—Military–prerogatives model to explain the 
interplay between the two aspects which results in civilian control in varying degrees and which ultimately 
decides establishment and consolidation of democracy. He further adds that no democracy in the world is 
theoretically or empirically immune to a crisis that might eventually upset a once-consolidated model of 
civilian control. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 98–101.  
17 Serra , The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, 13. 
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situation where the military assumes that they are the guarantors of the nation.18 In Sri 
Lanka too, the military with the popularity they have gained, may assume themselves as 
guarantors of the nation and act similarly. However, the latest scholarly work of Thomas 
C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson asserts that different countries may have their unique 
ways of political transition but, once such a phase is achieved, the ongoing democratic 
consolidation is similar of the most part.19 All of these arguments provide an ideal stand 
point from that to analyze the Sri Lankan context, a country in the process of establishing 
democratic consolidation after a civil war.  
Though many scholars have succeeded in introducing democratic consolidation in 
broad terms, they have taken a lesser interest in describing the important conditions that 
should exist for democratic consolidation of a country. In this context, Juan J. Linz and 
Alfred Stepan have made substantial contribution in their latest literature, and they 
describe five arenas of democratic consolidation that would be useful in analyzing the Sri 
Lankan issue. Further, they believe that for a country to be democratically consolidated, 
first it should become a state. In that sense Sri Lanka can proceed further without any 
hesitation. As per Linz and Stepan, the five conditions described need to be inter 
connected and mutually reinforced to ensure the democratic consolidation. The five 
arenas they describe are: a free and lively civil society, a relatively autonomous and 
valued political society, rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedom, a 
state bureaucracy that is usable by the democratic government, and an institutionalized 
economic society.20 However, high military influence of a country will automatically 
suppress the above conditions. In a similar scenario, the Sri Lankan military has already 
                                                 
18 The element most likely to undermine the process of consolidation is the military when it asserts 
itself as a tutelary power or creates its own autonomous space and takes areas of political decision making 
away from the government. The armed forces assert themselves as tutelary powers when they consider 
themselves guarantors of the nation. Serra, The Military Transition, 16.  
19 The literature findings on democratic transitions tend to differ to the degree that each country’s 
political transition is unique but this does not appear to be the case in democratic consolidation. Once that 
certain phase is reached, then general findings on political parties, electoral systems, bureaucracies, and the 
other institutions of democracy become relevant. Bruneau and Tollefson,ed., Who Guards the Guardians, 
3. 
20 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation, 7–15.  
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engaged in performing exaggerated roles in post war reconciliation activities, and this 
may also affect the consolidation of democracy.  
The scholarly work of S.E. Finer provides some excellent thoughts on military 
intervention. According to Finer, modern armies are a microcosm of the state and capable 
of self-sustaining.21 Therefore, in primitive economies they may be technically ahead of 
the civil sector, get involved in economic developments and dominate the society. 
However, when societies get advanced and complicated the military might lag behind and 
be less influential. However, the situation in Sri Lanka may be different as the military is 
as advanced as the civil sector, so it can dominate the civil society at any time. Finer 
further describes how, when public attachment to civilian institutions is strong the risk of 
military intervention is less. In post-war Sri Lanka the public’s attachment to the military 
may be higher than its attachment to public institutions, and that may create an 
opportunity for the military to intervene.22 
Secondly, there is rich literature, pertaining to civil-military relations in developed 
democracies, which reflects the coherent approaches focused on constant upheaval of 
democratic values. Even though such approaches were developed later in a much 
advanced civil-military environment, the primary literature on the subject is based on 
pioneering work of Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz on American civil-
military relations.23 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei argue that focus of 
those scholars is limited to developed democracies, especially to the United States where 
the main concerns are controlling the military and subordination of the military to ensure 
civilian supremacy. On the other hand the theories of Huntington and Janowitz mostly 
related to the consequences of trade-offs between security and liberty. Bruneau and Matei 
maintain that such approaches are problematic, as the literature focuses only on the 
                                                 
21 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 12–18. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Thomas C. Bruneau quotes Peter D. Fever who says that Huntington’s theory outlined in the Soldier 
and the State, remains the dominant theoretical paradigm in civil-military relations, especially in American 
Civil-Military relations…. and his model is widely acclaimed to be the most elegant, ambitious, and 
important on civil-military relations theory to date, Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots  for Profit: Contractors 
and the Military in U.S. National Security (California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 15. 
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domestic U.S. environment whose relevance is questionable elsewhere in the world.24 
Although earlier scholars had resorted to defining relations between civilians and the 
military narrowly as an interaction between the higher political elites and the top brass of 
the military, Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhulmann view that 
CMR should be comprehended in a broader context beyond the usual civil component 
(civilian political elites). They stress that it should be an all-inclusive approach that 
promotes military relations with the whole society, based on the terms of democratic 
values encompassing such norms as openness, transparency, accountability, legitimacy, 
and pluralism.25 
The scholarly work of Bernard Boene highlights that, during the last decade or so, 
the French armed services have undergone many changes in their strategic environment, 
organizational goals, and relationship between the state and society. He observes that the 
most striking factors related to such changes are the steep decline of resources in the 
armed services, both human and budgetary, and the increased confidence of the general 
public in the armed forces. The aforesaid reasons later became factors that fuelled the 
destabilization of civil-military relations in France. Affiliation with the European Union 
introduced new EU disciplines, such as budgetary restrictions, that brought about poor 
funding for the armed forces—a worrisome factor for the military. French political elites 
took advantage of military ethics that kept the military silent and accommodated the 
frequently made demands by the civilian sector. Political elites ignored the military’s 
professional viewpoint, which further widened the gap between the military and civilian 
authorities. The armed forces felt that they had been sidelined by political elites, while 
they maintained a long-standing top position as the most respected public institution of 
                                                 
24 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Toward a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization,909–929 Vol.15, No.5, December 2008, 
accessed on 10 July 2012, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22327/Bruneau_final_file.pdf.  
25 Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhulmann, argue that past academics have 
tended to define civil-military relations narrowly in terms of interactions between the top military and 
political elites. The broadening of the ‘civil’ component of the term is especially important given our 
interest in democratic civil-military relations, which argues for an inclusive approach that does not 
privilege civil political elites but views military relations with society in the broad terms suggested by 
democratic norms such as openness, transparency, accountability, legitimacy and pluralism. Hans Born, 
Marina Caparini, Karl W. Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhlmann, ed., Civil Military Relations in Europe: Learning 
Crisis and Institutional Change, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 5. 
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the country.26  Having neglected the military for almost three decades and having learned 
from the mistakes of promoting an all-volunteer force and Gendarmes,27 politicians 
realized the importance of the forgotten loyalty of the military and later on heeded 
professional military advice more attentively.  
Addressing the restricted budgets and reasserting the uniqueness of the military, 
the French politicians re-established cohesive civil-military relations in later years, which 
highlighted the importance of reaffirming the military identity of the country.28 In 
contrast, the Sri Lankan military cannot grumble as the government has been providing 
appropriate funds despite much difficulty in sustaining the military mechanism during the 
war. With the end of the war, however, the government has enforced certain budgetary 
restrictions, and the military may become agitated on such grounds in the future.  
Thirdly, there is literature on civil–military relations in emerging democracies. As 
Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhulmann point out, interest in 
scholars researching civil-military relations of developed democracies is fading as 
transitioning democracies offer more contrasting studies due to potential influence of the 
military. In that context, the literature on Poland’s road to civilian control explores some 
valuable insights in civil-military relations. Janusz Onysszkiewicz’s study on the former 
Communist regime of Poland confirms that the military is an extremely autocratic 
institution that demands complete and unconditional loyalty and commitment. Further, it 
is an organization that can muster a great force at any time the state may demand. The 
impact created by such institutions is amply described by Samuel Finer, Zoltan Brany, 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 177–183. 
27 Ibid., 184. 
28 Bernard Boene describes that that the role of the service members is to safeguard the nation’s higher 
interests by military means. The military profession is not a public service like others notwithstanding a 
few provisions to the contrary. As a consequence, members of the armed forces are citizens with a 
difference. Their identity is fashioned by the requirements of their profession and governed by a set of 
sacred principles which form the basis of its uniqueness. These principles, for service members are 
discipline, loyalty, unrestricted availability for duty, commitment that includes the possibility of sacrifice; 
for the state they are guaranteed protection of their interests and the legitimacy of their action on its behalf. 
Born, Caparini, Haltiner and Kuhlmann, ed., Civil Military Relations in Europe, 187. 
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and Thomas C. Bruneau.29 Thomas C. Bruneau argues that any armed force strong 
enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take over and run that country.30 
During the Communist regimes, the military in Poland was of the view that the armed 
forces were the custodians of national values and, therefore, understood the interests of 
the country more than the politicians. Furthermore, they believed that they had a moral 
obligation and duty to intervene in national politics when necessary. Samuel E. Finer 
views the popularity or the prestige of the military as a critical factor in military to 
intervention in governance.31 In a Communist environment, the idea of placing the 
military under civilian control was not a reality, and that situation prevailed not only in 
Poland but in many other countries in Central and the Eastern Europe. In such a setting, 
with overwhelming popular support, the democratic institutions of Poland endowed the 
military with even dictatorial powers. Further, the Polish military did not accept the 
concept of civilian control of the military, as they had a well embedded philosophy that 
civilians do not have any expertise in handling military matters. As a result, the military 
was utilized to fill Polish MOD positions with active military personnel, departing from 
the standard procedure as is followed by other countries. Janusz Onysszkiewicz states 
that Poland has now realized the need to establish civilian supremacy over the military; 
the importance of inculcating a defense culture in the minds of national political leaders, 
administrators, and local government officials, and most importantly, the fundamental 
formalization of civil-military relations through the constitution. While the case of Poland 
provides insights into Communist influence on civil-military relations, the negative 
impact that could arise from the military’s overwhelming popularity and its impression of 
sole expertise in the defense field could be related to the Sri Lankan context in the 
proposed study.  
                                                 
29 Janusz Onysszkiewicz quotes Samuel Finer’s observations that, instead of asking why the military 
engages in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political 
advantages of the military vis-à-vis other civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possesses 
vastly superior organization. And it possesses arms. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Civil–Military 
Relations and Democracy, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 99.  
30 Bruneau, Patriotic for Profit, 35. 
31 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 35. 
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By contrast, the literature on civil-military relations in Asian and African 
countries is comparatively limited. In such scarcity, the scholarly work of Jakkie Cilliers 
on Southern Africa provides limited knowledge on civil-military relations in this 
turbulent region. The region has suffered from major armed conflicts and, since 
decolonization, indigenous, highly politicized military cadres have existed, except for a 
few countries with some kind of matured military that accepts the supremacy of civilian 
control. Most of the militaries have either practiced European or Soviet doctrines, and by 
1980 two thirds of the countries south of the Sahara were ruled by soldiers. Some 
countries have been able to enter the transformation process peacefully to become 
democracies, although their prospects seem to be blurred. With this background one 
cannot expect rich literature to be generated from the said region on CMR.32 
Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn and Philip Lorenz’s theoretical and comparative 
research on democratization and civil-military relations of Asia expands to many 
countries transitioned from authoritarian regimes to democracies like Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Philippine, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. It proposes a 
conceptual scheme that allows a different comparative assessment on complex patterns of 
direct and indirect military influence that shapes civil-military relations. They view Asia 
as the best region with great diversity for drawing inferences on civil-military relations 
and democratization. As they highlight, most countries in the region have some form of 
experience of democratization, and in that, majority of the countries remain under 
authoritarian rule. As per their study, they categorize those countries as military rule 
(Burma/Myanmar), closed authoritarian rule under communist one party rule (China, 
Laos, Vietnam), and traditional monarchies and multiparty authoritarian regimes like 
Malaysia. Further, they maintain that demand for political liberalization has led the 
regimes transition into democracies along with third wave of democratization. During the 
process of transition, countries like South Korea and Taiwan has led to 
institutionalization and consolidation of liberal democracies, while countries like Pakistan 
and Thailand has failed to consolidate leading to breakdown of democracy. However, 
they highlight that the said democratic transitions have contributed reasonably to decline 
                                                 
32 Diamond and Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, 81–95.  
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military’s political power reducing the number of coups occur in the region significantly. 
Further, the new democratic environment has made those countries compelled to 
introduce new reforms to the civil-military relations contributing to demilitarizing of 
state, society, and the economy. However, in their study they have categorized Sri Lanka 
as a personalistic regime similar to Bhutan, Brunei and North Korea and excluded from 
the main study. This background on Asia and the regional trend is helpful for the study of 
civil-military relations in Sri Lanka.33  
Given the size and the diversity of the region, Carolina G. Hernandez believes 
that civil-military relations, especially in Southeast Asia, have colonial influences and are 
facing different challenges peculiar to the region.34 Carolina maintains that lack of 
experience in democratic governance by the political leaders in the post-colonial 
governments, instability created by strong ethnic and religious rivalries, lack of political 
institutions, and the judiciary may have allowed the military to intervene. The end of the 
Cold War diminished the Communist threat in the region, and such fundamental changes 
compelled governments to redefine the role of the military with force restructuring and 
budget cuts, which raised the concerns of the military. Carolina G. Hernandez argues that 
the prolonged internal and external conflicts of countries in the region have a profound 
impact on civil-military relations. Perhaps pertinent examples are the Kashmir conflict 
between India and Pakistan and the internal conflict that lasted in Sri Lanka for three 
decades between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE). In such scenarios, the countries have entrusted their militaries with major 
domestic responsibilities.35 Carolina stresses that the military’s domestic responsibilities 
should be limited only to a quick response, such as disaster relief on the basis of quick 
withdrawal after accomplishment of the task, and not extended to the deployment of the 
military in long-term assignments such as nation building. Indonesian armed forces, who 
                                                 
33 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn and Philip Lorenz, Breaking with the Past? Civil-Military Relations 
in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia (Hawaii: East-West Centre,2012), 1–11. 
34 Diamond and Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, 66–67.  
35 Carolina G. Hernandez observes that with the comprehensive and multidimensional concept of 
security prevalent in East Asia, the role of the military is not limited to defending the country against 
potential external threats. Rather, in countries such as Indonesia, the armed forces have been given major 
domestic responsibilities, Diamond and Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, 69.  
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engaged in nation building and are adopting the “dual function” (socio and economic) 
doctrine36 is an example. The argument of Carolina G. Hernandez directly opposes the 
role of the Sri Lankan armed forces who took part in reconciliation and nation-building, 
in the country that is the subject of this thesis.  
Extensive review of available literature relevant to the subject confirms that there 
is sufficient material pertaining to developed countries (with established democracies) 
and transitioning democracies (located mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin 
America, and Asia). In contrast, the literature available on Africa is more meager, and it 
is even difficult to find literature on countries in the Asian region that are in transition or 
consolidating as democracies, especially after conflicts. While utilizing the existing 
literature as a base for study, this thesis attempts to remedy the scarcity of literature 
available on Asia and provide some utility for scholars focusing on the South Asian 
region. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This research is an empirical study and intended to be carried out in the form of 
qualitative research utilizing secondary data gathered from various journals, reports 
submitted by governments, publications, newspaper articles, books and other literature 
from Dudley Knox Library and other books and journals available through inter-loan 
facilities from other libraries. The research will focus on civil-military practices adopted 
by the government of Sri Lanka and their effect on consolidation of democracy in the 
country. It will follow the system of a case study analysis supplemented by my own 
experiences as an officer with a twenty-three-year military career, twenty-years of them 
in the bitter civil war. 
                                                 
36 The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) are heavily involved in social-political 
affairs under the philosophy of dwifungsi. Dwifungsi says, basically that in addition to its role as a defense 
force, ABRI also has an active role to play in the creation and maintenance of social and political stability. 
Under this doctrine, ABRI officers are employed in an array of non-military roles, including provincial 
governors, ambassadors, senior civil servants and chiefs of state enterprises, Arief Budiman, “Military Dual 
Function Under Spot Light,” The Australian, August 10, 1996, 
http://peace.home.xs4all.nl/pubeng/pdm/OP271AB.html.  
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be divided in to five chapters. The first chapter will be dedicated 
to introducing the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, and the latest 
developments in civil-military relations in the country recovering after thirty years of 
civil war. Furthermore, the chapter will be enriched by the comprehensively reviewed 
literature on the subject, which covers significant thoughts and original insights of the 
various scholars involved in the field. Moreover, it will convene the diversified 
experiences of civil-military relations in different parts of the world to begin the 
discussion. 
Chapter II will incorporate the necessary theoretical background of the study by 
focusing on democratic transition, consolidation, and importance of civil-military 
relations. Likewise, this chapter will outline how civil-military relations play a decisive 
role in re-instituting democracy in a country and the resultant outcome. Within this 
theoretical context the chapter will introduce the important explanations of military 
prerogatives on which the central argument of the thesis depends.  
The issues specific to Sri Lanka will be taken up in Chapter III. The first of the 
four subsections will look at the aspects related to transition and consolidation of 
democracy in the country, and subsection two is intended to discuss the background of 
the civil war and highlight, civil-military relations maintained during the civil war period 
that paved the way to defeat the Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam. The next subsection will 
analyze the exaggerated roles and missions of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, which have 
become the focus of the critiques. The last subsection will explore the post-war civil-
military relations prevailing in the country since the end of the civil war, which has 
aroused numerous questions, and which necessarily relates to the military prerogatives.  
Chapter IV will analyze the impact of the post-civil war civil-military relations on 
democratic consolidation of Sri Lanka. Chapter V is the closing chapter of the study, will 
draw conclusions and provide answers to the complex questions raised on excessive 
military involvement, enhanced prerogatives of the military, civilian supremacy over the 
armed forces, and democratic consolidation. In conclusion the study will highlight the 
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invaluable lessons learned and best/worst practices, which would strengthen the civil-
military relations mechanism to ensure a consolidated democracy that is the most 
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND-INSIGHTS ON 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION, CIVIL 
MILITARY RELATIONS, AND MILITARY PREROGATIVES 
Laying the theoretical background is a necessity prior to proceeding with the 
specific case study of Sri Lanka. The chapter briefly discusses the relevant and important 
theoretical terms and explanations that will be useful to comprehending the study.  
A. WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION? 
In the simplest form, “transition” can be defined as an interval between one 
political regime and another. Democratic transition (or transition to democracy) can be 
described as the process in which authoritarian regimes transform to democracies. 
Transitions are delimited on one side by the launching of the process to terminate an 
authoritarian regime and on the other by establishing some degree of democracy, 
returning to some form of authoritarian rule, or allowing the emergence of a rebellious 
alternative.37 
In most situations, transitions and resultant democratizations involve the crucial 
component of mobilization and organization of a large number of individuals. Scholars 
like O’Donnell and Schmitter relate transition to a cycle of mobilization. In the early 
phases of a transition, oppositions tend to remain inactive considering the massive cost of 
opposing an authoritarian rule. When transition is underway and liberalization comes into 
play, the opposition is automatically mobilized and a resurrection of civil society takes 
place. Finally, when an acceptable transition is achieved, demobilization of cohesive 
opposition elements and democratization may occur.38 This might not be a general 
pattern applicable to all countries, and may differ from country to country.  
                                                 
37 Scott Mainwaring, “Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and 
Comparative Issues,” Working Paper- Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, November, 1989. 
accessed on December 26, 2012. 
http://www.undp.org.eg/portals/0/int%20forum/democratic%20consolidation_mainwaring.pdf. 
38 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation, 66–68.  
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In the path to democracy, Adam Przeworski has identified two types of 
transitions: the bottom up transition and top down transition. The bottom up transition 
takes place when people rise up and overthrow an authoritarian regime through a popular 
revolution. In most instances well before a popular mobilization divisions within an 
authoritarian regime becomes visible. Cracks in the regime occur between the hardliners 
and the liberalizers who survive within an authoritarian regime. The liberalizers within an 
authoritarian environment see the possibility and tend to make alliances with the civilian 
society and that leads to crack of the regimes. Therefore, liberalization occurs as result of 
interaction between the civil society and the splits of the authoritarian regime. The 
popular mobilizations indicates potential liberalizers the possibility of making alliances 
with civil society. The civil society identifies availability of political space for them to 
function autonomously when they observe visible splits within an authoritarian power 
bloc. In that manner in liberalization process, splits of a regime and popular mobilizations 
interact feeding each other. The resultant liberalization—transition may last for days to 
years.39  
In the top down approach the authoritarian rulers introduces liberalizing reforms 
that finally leading to democratic transition. It is a controlled form of opening of political 
spaces for civil society. The signs of imminent popular unrest and signs of probable split 
within an authoritarian regime may prompt the authoritarian rulers to allow some space 
for the autonomous organizations of the civil society to function. Through this initiative 
the authoritarian regimes try to relax the social tension and incorporate new social groups 
while expanding their social base. However, in this form of liberalization the transition 
takes place per the interests and values of authoritarian rulers.40  
Transition to democracy of a country depends on the institutional character of the 
state elite who are involved in the day-to-day activities of a state. In Linz and Stepan’s 
view, there are four distinctive types of state elites who can be influential in democratic 
transfer and consolidation: hierarchical military, nonhierarchical military, civilian elites 
                                                 




and sultanistic elites. The officers’ corps in a hierarchical military regime is an important 
element favorable for transitions as it has enduring interests about the state rather than 
short-term interests in an undemocratic rule. Further, officers prefer the existence of a 
stable state and the availability of a government that would fulfill their long-term 
interests. As an extrication strategy, hierarchical military regimes prefer to hold 
democratic elections. The military in most countries has uncontended power and access 
to opportunities, and any democratic government that assumes power following a 
transition needs to deal with the military. However, when weaker coalitions force the 
ruling military to leave office, the military may negotiate terms to retain nondemocratic 
prerogatives and create conditions difficult for a smooth transition.41 The nonhierarchical 
military regime, which is led by officers of the level of colonels and majors, poses 
comparatively less of a threat to democratic transition and consolidation as its officers 
prefer to adopt extrication strategies and establish formal hierarchies that would be 
helpful for transitions.42 
In sultanistic regimes, the ruler personalizes the government through penetration 
of the state, political society and the civil society by pervasive means. Further, it is 
difficult to identify whether these regimes are led by the military or by civilians. 
Moreover, since these regimes are governed by one ruler or governed only by close 
family members of the ruler, they are susceptible to sudden and severe movements of the 
civil society, and assassination of the leader or the overthrow of his person by an armed 
rebellion may lead to transition of the state.43 
In contrast, regimes led by civilians (even post totalitarian civilian regimes with 
communist parties) have more robust institutional, symbolic, and absorptive capacities 
than military or sultanistic regimes, so they can direct and manage transitions more 
efficiently. Because civilian regimes have more access to civilian society, they are more 
capable of negotiating complex reform packages than military or the sultanistic regimes. 
Further, civilians view themselves as prospective winners and rulers of the democratic 
                                                 
41 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation, 66–68. 
42 Ibid,. 68. 
43 Ibid,. 70. 
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regimes to be established. India and Sri Lanka are two examples for countries that have 
transitioned to democracies led by civilian regimes.  
In the context of colonized countries, most of them won independence through 
populist revolutions and some through peaceful negotiations. These countries 
subsequently transitioned to their own rule, however, most processes were shadowed by 
imperial legacies. After decolonization, the countries who won independence have 
established different types of governments—military and civilian. While some countries 
have benefited from imperial experiences, in other, colonizers have ruined the traditional 
state structures derailing subsequent democratic transition and consolidation processes.  
As per Linz and Stepan democratic transition can only be completed when 
agreements are made and procedures are established to elect a government by popular 
vote through free and fair elections, and elected government has power to formulate 
policies. Further, the three main pillars of democracy: executive, legislative and the 
judiciary are made independent and full functional without sharing power with any other 
authority.44  
B. WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION? 
Philippe C. Schmitter’s definition of consolidation of democracy first refers to the 
regime consolidation. To describe, “it consists in transforming the accidental 
arrangements, prudential norms and contingent solutions that emerged in relation to the 
above issues during uncertain struggles of transition into structures.”45 Consolidation of 
democracy, which occurs next, is transforming the said ad hoc patterns in to stable 
structures confirming to a specific standard.46  
Later in the same chapter, Schmitter concludes that consolidation of democracy 
can be conceived, measured and ultimately evaluated as a process of linking emergent 
political institutions to economic and social groups whose support is crucial to their long-
                                                 
44 Ibid,. 3. 
45 Philippe C. Schmitter’s defines regime consolidation and consolidation of democracy…Pridham, 
Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, 539. 
46 Ibid. 
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run survival. He further emphasize on linkages formed between various types of private 
constituencies and public authorities, and guaranties and privileges extended to capital, 
religious authorities, aristocracies, armed forces, police, ethnic minorities, local 
communities, secret societies, or the civil service to sustain their commitment to the 
democratic bargain.47  
In Linz and Stepan view, for consolidation of democracy first a state should exist. 
When the basic fulfillment the existence of a state—is achieved, a functioning state 
should accomplish five other inter-connected, mutually reinforcing conditions in order 
for the democracy to be consolidated. They are: conditions supporting development of a 
free and lively civil society, availability of a relatively autonomous and valued political 
society, assurance of rule of law and legal guarantees of the citizens, availability of a 
state bureaucracy that can function for a democratic government, and the availability of 
an institutionalized economic society.48 
A free and lively civil society is a necessity for democratic consolidation, and it 
encompasses a wide variety of social groups, such as self-organized groups, movements 
and individuals who try to voice their interests. Further, the civil society can include 
diverse social movements like women’s associations, neighborhood associations, 
religious groupings, intellectual organizations and civil associations like trade unions. 
Lately, civil society includes social media (Twitter, Facebook to name a few). These 
organizations, which represent a wide spectrum of the social strata, are capable of 
organizing a great force through large mobilizations not only by their memberships but 
also by including other civilians who form a crucial part of the huge force demanding a 
change of regimes. The latest examples in this context are Egypt and Tunisia where 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 551.  
48 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation, 7. 
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people of the two countries changed the autocratic regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Zine 
el-Abidine Ben Ali, respectively, through popular uprising.49 
In a democratic environment, the politicians assume democratic rights to control a 
state, and it is in the political society that they contests for it. Although, a civil society can 
help to end a non-democratic regime, proper transition and consolidation can only be 
achieved through active participation of a political society. Further, the political society 
demonstrates control over public power and the state apparatus. The political society is a 
combination of core institutions, such as political parties, elections, electoral rules, 
political leadership, interparty alliances and legislatures through, which they construct 
democracies. There is a tendency, however, of neglecting civil society over the other, or 
vis-à-vis, that might affect consolidation of democracy in a state. This happens when 
democratic leaders of the political society try to demobilize the very same civil society 
that has brought them to democratic politics. Therefore, in a democratic consolidation 
process, both civil and political societies are required to be treated with equal importance 
while assuring they function freely.50 
For democratic consolidation of a state, in addition to the autonomy of civil and 
political society, both should be further supported by legal guarantees and rule of law. 
Constitutions can provide enough guidelines in this behalf, and it is democratic 
governments that should ensure fair rule while maintaining law and order toward every 
citizen. Governments should uphold the spirit of the constitution that provides greater 
consensus over the constitutional framework, which enables the legal guarantees of the 
people. The inculcating of a strong legal culture in the society and independence of the 
judiciary are other important factors that most countries fail to establish in the 
democratization process.51 
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In a democratic environment, ensuring that the rights of the citizens are 
guaranteed and protected should have the monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a 
state’s territory. To ensure security, a democratic country needs to maintain legitimate 
security forces (armed forces, police, intelligence etc.). In addition, there are numerous 
other services that governments provide, like judicial services, education, health and 
transport, all of which need large infrastructure and colossal amounts of money and, 
therefore, collection of taxes from the citizens of a country. To maintain such 
complicated services, new democracies need strong bureaucracies. Moreover, these are 
considered a prerequisite for democratic consolidation.52  
The fifth and the last supportive condition important for consolidation of 
democracy is the availability of a sufficiently institutionalized economic society. 
Economic theorists claim that democratic consolidation cannot exist in either command 
economies or pure-market economies. In that context, consolidating democracies require 
an economic society that incorporates socio-politically accepted norms, organizations, 
and procedures that can arbitrate between the government and the market. This can 
facilitate greater market autonomy and ownership diversity in an economy, which can 
necessarily create a lively civil society supporting the consolidation of democracy.53 
Furthermore, for transitions to take place the availability of dominant actors in 
democratic politics is not always important, and in the same way actors who are 
important for transitions are not essentially required for democratic politics. As an 
example, parties and elections, which are important to ensure democratic governance, 
may not be important for the transition phase of a country. 
In summary, the consolidation of democracy is a composite outcome of the 
interrelated functions of, at least, the five facets described. Further, it highlights that none 
of the arenas described can function individually without the support of the others and 
that democracy is an interactive system different from the previously prevailing historical 
regimes.  
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C. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY  
Since the third wave of democratization, many countries in the third world have 
transitioned to democracies, including former military dictatorships. In some of the new 
democracies, depending on the role during non-democratic regime, and role they played 
during transition, the military may present a potential threat to democratic civilian rule. 
For example, the armed forces were the chief props of the authoritarian regimes in 
Portugal and Spain, and actively took part in the transition to democracy. In other 
countries, like Chile, the armed forces were the authoritarian regime and continued to 
have high authority even after the transition. On a different note, in Romania, while 
armed forces were not supporting the communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, the army 
played a prominent role in the transition process of converting the dictatorship of 
Ceausescu into a democracy.  
For these reasons, civil-military relations have become a key concern in both the 
literature and the political agenda, and most analysts discuss civil-military relations as an 
important determinant of democracy.54 The importance of civil-military relations for 
democratic consolidation was highlighted by Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Schmitter, 
O’Donnell, Diamond, Przeworski, Platner, Bruneau and Cristiana Matei who draw 
attention to the military variable of COD, in particular civilian control. Studies on 
democratic control of armed forces have also highlighted relevance of civilian control in 
the overall democratization process. Within the same context of democratic civilian 
control, Stepan looks at the prerogatives, and how they impact COD (which will be 
addressed in the next subsection). 
In this context, one could argue that democracies have preferred controlling the 
armed forces and subordinating the military to civilian control.55 With the evolution of 
democracies, new security challenges like terrorism have emerged, and countries have 
been compelled to maintain a sizable strength of armed forces to meet such contemporary 
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security challenges. Especially in the twenty-first century, armed forces the world over 
have been assigned to perform additional roles beyond their traditional tasks. This has 
allowed them to be involved in civil-related tasks, too. In this background, the recent 
studies on civil-military relations have expanded their scope beyond the concern for 
controlling the armed forces toward a trinity of civil-military relations: democratic 
civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency supporting the consolidation of 
democracy.56 
D. MILITARY PREROGATIVES, CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION  
The military in any country is identified as an important unit in the state 
apparatus, and it may be empowered through the constitution to safeguard national 
interests. The aforementioned empowerment sometimes is misinterpreted by the military 
as a prerogative making it an exclusive and privileged entity that can interfere in the 
democratic governance of a country. Military involvement beyond its assigned 
responsibilities in a country is a democratically unaccepted norm and can be detrimental 
to civil-military relations and the consolidation of democracy in any country, irrespective 
of developed or consolidating democracies.  
Alfred Stepan describes eleven types of prerogatives that can affect democratic 
governance by creating different levels of instability in various sectors—creating high, 
moderate, and low effects. Stepan’s first prerogative is the constitutionally sanctioned 
independent role played by the military in the political system. His second prerogative is 
the relationship of the military with the chief executive of the country. The next 
prerogative is the involvement of the military in the coordination of the defense apparatus 
of the state. The fourth prerogative is representation in the cabinet by active duty military 
members. The fifth prerogative is military involvement in the country’s legislature. The 
sixth prerogative is military presence in the senior career level of civilian appointments. 
The seventh prerogative is military involvement in the state intelligence apparatus. The 
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eighth prerogative is the role played by the police. The ninth prerogative is the role 
played by the military in awarding promotions. The tenth prerogative is the military role 
in state enterprises, and the last prerogative is the role played in the legal system.57 In 
most circumstances, when the military acts within the aforesaid prerogatives, a civilian 
government will run into a conflict. When countries manage with fewer military 
prerogatives, there is less contestation and this can be referred to as an ideal situation that 
will support consolidation. All other situations created through the effects of military 
prerogatives cause conflict, and do not create a suitable environment to enhance civil-
military relations. Finally, they do not enforce stable democratic governance in a 
country.58 
The chapter describes about democratic transition, democratic consolidation, 
civil-military relations, and the connection of military prerogatives to civil-military 
relations and democratic consolidation. The transitions are basically intervals between the 
political regimes, and depend much on the institutional character of four types of state 
elites. They are hierarchical military, nonhierarchical military, civilian elites and 
sultanistic elites, and the transitions of colonized countries have occurred through 
populist revolutions or peaceful negotiations. The transitions become complete only 
when important components of democracy: executive, legislative and the judiciary are 
established. However, for both aspects, transition to democracy and democratic 
consolidation, civil-military relations will be an important determinant. Therefore, in any 
country the military becomes a decisive factor determining transitions and consolidation 
of democracy. These being the core concepts of the study, the chapter leads to a detailed 
account of Sri Lanka, which analyses wide variety of issues pertaining to democratic 
transition, democratic consolidation and civil-military relations specific to the country.  
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III. SRI LANKA 
A. BACKGROUND ON THE TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION OF 
DEMOCRACY IN SRI LANKA 
1. Historical Background Prior to Transition 
The transition of Sri Lanka in to a democracy commenced in the year 1948 with 
the obtaining of independence from British colonial rule. Sri Lanka had been under the 
imperial rule of the Portuguese, Dutch and the British for over approximately four 
hundred and fifty years. The British, as the last colonizers, ruled the country for nearly 
one hundred and fifty years; during which time they introduced many changes to our 
culture, to our traditions, and to state structure. By the time of transformation from 
British rule to an independent democratic state, the required bureaucracy, police and 
defense forces, public education system, and judicial system had been already developed 
in Sri Lanka.59 In addition, private establishments had emerged and were slowly gaining 
legitimacy. The British colonial rulers granted universal franchise to the Sri Lankans in 
1938. Since then, a broader political organizing took place in the country, which 
established an anti-colonial and nationalistic movement led by the local elites who 
convinced the British rulers of their desire for independence.60  
2. Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation 
The transition of Sri Lanka in to a democracy commenced in the year 1948 with 
the obtaining of independence from British colonial rule. Unlike in most British colonies 
and especially that of neighboring India, the transformation from colonial rule to an 
independent state in Sri Lanka took place in a relatively peaceful manner. The British 
granted independence to Sri Lanka on February 04, 1948, and transformed the country 
initially into a dominion status of the British to function under a Governor-General. On 
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May 22, 1972, Sri Lanka turned into a republic when full autonomy was granted with 
establishment of the new constitution parallel to the third wave of democratization61 
expanding in Asia and Latin America. 
The situation in Sri Lanka in 1948 was, in contrast, stable, peaceful and in order.62 
As the transfer of power took place in a smooth and peaceful manner, the British created 
a new capital class in Sri Lanka, constituted of the elites, and little was seen of the 
divisions and bitterness tearing at the recently obtained independence of the new nations 
of South Asia. By the time of independence, in addition to a social structure different 
from the traditional, the British have established important components of a democracy—
—the executive, legislature and the judiciary. These institutions of the country developed 
rapidly, however, in all areas of concern the British influence was prevalent. Further, 
governors of the country retained the British Ceylon armed forces formed during the 
imperial rule, which completed the important requisites of a newly independent nation. In 
addition, critical determinants of liberalization like formation of political parties,63 
holding of elections64 and amendment of the constitution took place in the contemporary 
period, which strengthened the progressive democracy of Sri Lanka.  
Britain’s divide-and-rule policy during their colonial rule, however, had boldly 
favored the minority community at the expense of the majority community of Sinhalese 
in its religion, language and culture. In this context, the majority Sinhalese viewed 
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independence and transfer of power as a mechanism that would restore the rightful place 
of the Sinhala language, Buddhism and the intertwined culture. In the elections held in 
1947, D. S. Senanayake from the majority Sinhala community was elected as the Prime 
Minister.65 
3. Deterioration of Democracy 
Within a few months after gaining independence, one of the most pressing issues 
since the British colonial times—the Tamil problem—was settled when Tamil politicians 
like G.G Ponnambalam joined the government. Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake steered 
the government toward a settlement of the Tamil issue with moderate political opinion 
and sensitivity toward minority interests. This development of affairs was seen by the 
minorities as a genuine democratic effort made by the majority Sinhalese government.66 
Senanayake understood that a multi-cultural society in a country like Sri Lanka, which 
was in the last phase of the transfer of power, should give due consideration of its 
minority if the country was going to be democratically consolidated. In that sense, the 
government ensured there was no discrimination against the minorities and a moderate 
opinion in politics—the political party representing the majority community at the same 
time was acceptable to the minority—and to abandon the concept of secular state and 
ensure neutrality toward all religions.67 
The stability achieved in 1948 in the democratization process had eroded by 1956 
when SWRD Bandaranayke became the Prime Minister and introduced a “Sinhala Only” 
official Language Act. It was seen as an abandonment of the multi-racial policy and 
agitated the Tamil minority. That led to the creation of a separate historical past for the 
Tamils, for their linguistic unity and distinctiveness.68 Soon, the combustible nature of a 
linguistic nationalism in a multi-cultural society became obvious when nationwide riots 
erupted. Although the “Sinhala Only” language policy did not come into effect in its 
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original form, the damage was done and it affected the consolidation of democracy in the 
country, emphasizing the role of language as a determinant of nationhood. Further, this 
laid the seed for a demand for autonomy for the Northern and Eastern Provinces where a 
majority of the Tamils lived—a claim later altered by the LTTE in the separatist war.  
During the next decade or so, an independent Sri Lanka progressed as a liberal 
democracy although with ups and downs. It took the form of a classic parliamentary 
system with organized political parties contesting local and national elections. The two 
main power blocs replaced each other after almost every election, and the public 
participation in elections was among the highest recorded in the world.69 Various 
apparatus of the government—administrative, legislative, judicial and accounting—
enjoyed some level of autonomy. State-society relations were maintained at an acceptable 
level, which supported the progress of the liberal democracy. In addition, the 
associational life was vigorous, and as a whole the overall situation in the country was 
supportive of a liberal democracy. In this scenario, the country enjoyed a less violent 
period, and accordingly no state effort was taken to strengthen the armed forces. 
Therefore, the armed forces remained insignificant by any criterion—budget, equipment, 
training, experience, power or status.70 
A period of turmoil erupted in 1971 when an island-wide, Sinhalese youth 
uprising took place and the government was compelled to use comparatively weak, ill-
equipped military to curb the rebellion. The constitutional changes adopted in 1972 
provided more state patronage to Sinhalese nationalists and Buddhism, which pushed the 
country toward an ethnocracy. The Sinhalese community learnt electoral politics and they 
utilized it to demand and dictate state policies, and sometimes the outcomes were 
discriminating the minority. However, the Sinhalese could not dictate terms on 
population based representation and selection criteria adopted for state sector jobs and 
education as per the constitution. This system was advantageous for the minority Tamils 
spread all over the country even though in small numbers. When the minority Tamils 
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gained disproportionate representation in the universities and in the civil service, the 
majority Sinhalese were marginalized. The government through a new constitution 
devised a weightage system blocking the overrepresentation and additional opportunities 
enjoyed by the Tamils—that later led to discriminating them. This incident sighted a new 
approach to controlling democracy in Sri Lanka.71 Stemming from irregularities and lack 
of opportunities in bureaucratic, commercial, and educational spheres, mobilization of the 
Tamil youth slowly took place, transforming into a freedom struggle by the latter part of 
the 1970s.72 The continuous galvanizing of the Tamil youth under the banner of Eelam 
expanded the LTTE movement, which allowed it to stage feared attacks on the 
democracy of Sri Lanka in the next four decades.  
The constitutional reforms in 1978 transformed the system of governance of Sri 
Lanka from a British-imported, Westminster-style parliamentary system to an executive 
presidential system, and since then political processes have changed radically from the 
previous ethos. Concentrating on an economic agenda and open economic policies, the 
Sri Lankan government during the said era ignored political values and civil principles 
for economic and political expediency.73 This had far reaching effects on democratic 
consolidation in the country. 
Since the eruption of the Eelam Wars in 1983, the country has been pushed into a 
war footing and remained under emergency regulations for more than three decades. The 
new bill on Prevention of Terrorists Acts (PTA) was also detrimental to the consolidation 
of democracy, while LTTE terrorists grossly violated basic human rights. Their inhuman 
attacks eroded democracy of the country. The prolonged violence and resultant 
institutional breakdowns did not give any hope for reestablishment of democracy in Sri 
Lanka. The only hope was ending the civil war first, which had diluted the democracy 
under the tenacity of the LTTE terrorism and the absence of moderate political 
maneuvering of the government of Sri Lanka. However, it was an illusion as the Eelam 
Wars continued until the LTTE was militarily defeated in May 2009.  
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The termination of the civil war has brought new hope for an era of democratic 
consistency, but repairing damage caused to the democracy during the civil war will be a 
challenging task for the national leadership and the whole society of Sri Lanka.74 
B. CHALLEGES TO CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY-THE CIVIL 
WAR IN SRI LANKA 
The inception of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was similar to 
other militant groups in the world. The LTTE, which started in the form of a common 
insurgent uprising, gradually developed into a full–fledged separatist terrorist 
organization similar to Hizbollah75 in the Middle-East, demanding an independent state 
called Tamil Eelam, which encompassed virtually the entire North and East of the Island. 
During three decades of armed conflict, approximately 100,000 lives were lost and 
billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure was destroyed in the North and East, which 
almost paralyzed the economy of the whole country.  
The history of the civil war in Sri Lanka falls into four distinct phases covering 
nearly three decades of violent conflict.76 Punctuated by both long and short term cease-
fires observed by the parties to the conflict—the government of Sri Lanka and the 
LTTE—Eeelam Wars I, II, III, and IV were fought mainly in the northern and eastern 
provinces of the country, although the war affected the security and stability of the entire 
country.  
Tensions between the Tamil extremist groups and the government over ethnic, 
linguistic issues had been brewing predominantly in northern Sri Lanka largely since 
1970s in the context of poor political response by ruling governments. However, these 
events did not turn into a distinctive armed struggle until the 1980s. Although the LTTE 
grew in strength and organization day by day undercover, they did not pose an apparent 
threat to the armed forces deployed in the Jaffna peninsula—the heartland of the LTTE. 
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The first attack on the military took place in October 1981, when the LTTE attacked and 
murdered a soldier on duty at Stanley Road in Jaffna. Then skirmishes took place on and 
off until July, 23, 1983, when 13 soldiers of the Sri Lankan Army were ambushed and 
murdered by the LTTE at Thirunelveli, in Jaffna. This single incident created a new 
dimension in the civil war in Sri Lanka and also marked the commencement of Eelam 
War I. Against that backdrop, the following paragraphs elaborate different phases of the 
civil war highlighting how the armed forces of Sri Lanka engaged in the bitter war under 
different conditions and constraints, fulfilling directives of the governments in power 
during those different eras.  
1. EELAM WAR-1 
The onset of the civil war in Sri Lanka is generally ascribed to “Black July,”77 the 
incident that occurred in 1983. The massacre of 13 soldiers by the LTTE in an ambush in 
the Jaffna Peninsula created anger amongst the majority in the South and triggered riots 
throughout the country. Although riots were controlled by the police and the armed forces 
within a few days the fighting in the North and East was intensified by the LTTE, 
targeting government officials, civilians, and armed forces positioned in the North and 
East. By that time the Sri Lankan military—which consisted of all three armed forces the 
Army, the Navy and the Air Force—had already departed from its ceremonial posture 
and was exposed to the increasing threat of the Tamil Tigers as an operationally oriented 
force. The only previous instance of the Sri Lankan Military becoming operationally 
deployed was the armed youths uprising in 1971.78 Since then the armed forces of Sri 
Lanka had barely maneuvered in the country except during natural calamities. In the 
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subsequent period, the LTTE grew rapidly, increasing their cadres79—training them 
locally and internationally in neighboring countries.80 
The LTTE claimed the North and East of Sri Lanka as their exclusive homeland 
and started ethnic cleansing by massacring poor Sinhalese civilians in the farming 
villages of Kent and Dollar Farms in Mullthivu in the North in 1984. In 1985, the LTTE 
carried out a series of attacks in the sacred city of Anuradhapura, targeting pilgrims, 
worshipers, Buddhist monks, and nuns inside the sacred Sri Mahabodhi81 premises, 
gunning down more than 146 personnel and injuring hundreds of civilians.  
The scattered incidents occurred in different parts of the island could not be 
prevented by any of the authorities responsible for national security. Both the military 
and the police suffered from insufficient strength and logistical shortcomings to 
undertake tasks of such intensity in the South. The primary attention of the military was 
focused on battling the LTTE in the North, while the Sri Lankan Police could manage 
nothing beyond primitive community policing that was insufficient to counter the 
increased activities of the LTTE.  
 
                                                 
79 No source has been able to determine exact strength of the LTTE, and in what numbers they grew 
with expansion of the movement. However, the South Asia Terrorism Portal based on their research claims 
that LTTE organization possessed at least 17000–20000 cadres comprising ground, air and sea fighters. 
“Institute for Conflict Management- South Asia Terrorism Portal.” accessed on January 24, 2013. 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM.  
80 Marshall R. Singer, “Sri Lanka’s Tamil-Sinhalese Ethnic Conflict: Alternative Solutions,” Asian 
Survey Vol. 32, No 8 (1992). accessed on November 28, 2012, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2645364.pdf. 
81 The Sacred Jaya Siri Maha Bodhi in Anuradhapura is reckoned as the oldest surviving historical tree 
in the world. It was brought to Sri Lanka by the Their Sangamitta, daughter of Emperor Asoka and was 
planted in the Mahameghavana Park in Anuradhapura in 249 BC by King Devanampiyatissa. It is said to be 
the southern branch of the Jaya Siri Maha Bodhi at Buddha Gaya in India under which Lord Buddha 
attained enlightenment. The Mahavamsa or the Great Chronicle of the Sinhalese provides an elaborate 
account of the establishment of the Jaya Siri Maha Bodhi in the island. Bodhi means wisdom that 
understands the four Noble Truths. Thus, the tree which assisted Lord Buddha to achieve wisdom or 
enlightenment is called Bodhi. “Srimahabodhi,” accessed on November 11, 2012. http://srimahabodhi.org/.  
 37
In 1985, to find a solution for the conflict, the government of Sri Lanka negotiated 
peace talks with the LTTE in Thimphu, Bhutan,82 for the first time in the history of the 
civil war. The negotiations, however, failed over the extreme LTTE demands for an 
independent state for the Tamils.  
In 1987, two years after the failed negotiations, the armed forces of Sri Lanka 
launched “Operation Wadamarachchi,” concentrating on a single front, the first ever 
conventional military operation since Independence. It tested the newly acquired counter-
terrorist capability of an operational outfit converted from a ceremonial setting. The aim 
of the operation was to liberate the Jaffna peninsula, and the offensive proved successful. 
During the bloody clashes, the LTTE carried out their first-ever ferocious, suicide, black 
tiger-attack killing more than 40 soldiers. It later became the iconic deterrence of the 
LTTE in the Eelam War. The Sri Lanka military operation was a landmark event of the 
entire Eelam War as it was about to crush the LTTE in the Jaffna peninsula and end the 
conflict.  
Reacting to the pressure of the majority Tamil community of the southern state of 
Tamil Nadu, the central government of India forced the government of Sri Lanka to 
terminate the military onslaught against the LTTE. India blatantly violating the 
sovereignty of Sri Lanka and forcefully airdropped food and other relief items to the rebel 
held areas.83 The government of Sri Lanka succumbed to the pressure of the powerful 
neighbor and ordered the military to step back. This single incident demoralized the 
military and fostered displeasure toward the government. The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord 
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(ILPA) was signed on July 29, 1987, and a massive Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)84 
arrived in Sri Lanka to disarm the LTTE and establish peace in the North and East, per 
the treaty. The discontented Sri Lankan armed forces were ordered to retire to the 
barracks while the IPKF took over the controls, marking the end of Eelam War 1 from Sri 
Lanka’s stand point and commencement of an unsuccessful mission for the huge Indian 
military. The signing of the ILPA demoralized the Sri Lankan military, and a 
considerable discontent circulated among all ranks about the political leadership.  
2. EELAM WAR II 
The second phase of the Eelam War was a period of bloodshed, which dismantled 
the life of the people of the entire country. Re-establishment of peace and security in the 
North and East was vested with the IPKF, while a portion of the Sri Lanka military was 
deployed to the South to curb an armed insurrection led by the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP),85 a Marxist group that used violence to demand the expulsion of the 
Indian army from Sri Lankan soil and to eliminate social injustice. Under the devolution 
of power introduced through the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, the North and East 
provincial councils were headed by a puppet leader of the LTTE. He carried out the 
necessary ground work toward the establishment of an independent state within the state 
of Sri Lanka (Tamil Eelam)86 to fulfill thirst of the LTTE. Realizing the impending threat 
of the LTTE’s unilateral declaration of independence in the North and East, president of 
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Sri Lanka Ranasinghe Premadasa dissolved the problematic provincial council. He 
further pressured the Indian government to withdraw the IPKF as a measure to settle an 
uproar led by the JVP. By then the IPKF’s role in Sri Lanka had become India’s 
Vietnam,87 and the huge IPKF force was unceremoniously withdrawn on March 24, 
1990, having lost more than 1200 soldiers and with thousands more wounded in the face 
of the fierce LTTE, making the ILPA a total failure. 
The limited strength of the Sri Lanka military deployed in the South, imposed by 
the JVP insurrection, posed a challenge, so the government expanded the Special Task 
Force (STF)88—a paramilitary group under the Police. The departure of the IPKF marked 
the redeployment of the Sri Lankan military in the North and the East. Under such 
circumstances, President Premadasa once again attempted negotiations with the LTTE 
during the period of 1987–1990, but once again the LTTE outsmarted the government of 
Sri Lanka, and the peace attempt was shattered.  
In the subsequent years of the war, the Sri Lankan military had to face much more 
brutal resistance from the LTTE, which had reorganized and trained during the IPKF 
presence. During this period the Sri Lankan military had not relaxed or followed any 
training. It was out on streets in the South performing counter-insurgency maneuvers 
against the extremist JVP. The period from 1989–1990 is still recalled as the years of 
extreme terror in Sri Lanka, as the military attempted to suppress revolts on two fronts—
one in the North and the other in the South.89  
The Sri Lankan military with its limited strength was finding it hard to ensure the 
security of civilians in the entire North and East in addition to their commitments in other 
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parts of the island, including the capital city of Colombo. The biggest setback for the 
government forces occurred in the year 2000, when the strategic army garrison at 
Elephant Pass—the gateway to the Jaffna peninsula—was overrun by an unexpected 
5000 LTTE cadres who claimed the lives of more than 2000 soldiers.90  
Another crucial incident that affected the military was the land mine explosion in 
Araly in Jaffna on August 8, 1992, which killed most of the military top brass who led 
the battle against the LTTE. The LTTE’s highest achievement was the assassination of 
President Ranasinghe Premadasa by a suicide black tiger cadre at a May Day rally in 
Colombo in 1993.91 In a series of major setbacks, LTTE attacks on strategic Poonaryn 
Army and Navy camps situated at the tip of the mainland linking the Jaffna peninsula 
were also critical as the government forces lost approximately 1000 soldiers and a few 
pieces of heavy artillery, armor and other defense logistics. These attacks demonstrated 
the lack of strategic planning and complete disarray of the government’s approach in 
confronting war and an unconventional enemy.92 
3. EELAM WAR III 
Amidst a fragile security situation, the elections held in 1994 brought in new hope 
for peace as Chandrika Bandaranayake Kumaranathunge came to power on a peace 
platform as the President of Sri Lanka with a sweeping percentage of 62% votes. 
However, the situation in the country became even bloodier in next few years. The brief 
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launched an attack and blew up two navy vessels on April 19, 1995, in Trincomalee in 
eastern Sri Lanka.93 The incident gave a sound start for Eelam War III which ravaged the 
country for another seven years.  
During Eelam War III the LTTE gave the biggest setback for the Sri Lanka Air 
Force as they introduced the “Stinger” missile on April 19, 1995, bringing down two HS-
748 Avro military transport aircraft in the Jaffna peninsula.94 In the subsequent period, 
they brought down as many as 29 SLAF aircraft through their deadly stinger missiles 
which demoralized the entire Air Force. The government fell into a difficult situation as it 
could not provide a suitable self-protection system for their military aircraft.  
Leaving aside the setback, and armed with a new defense minister the new 
government entrusted the military to recapture the entire Jaffna peninsula. In a joint 
environment, they were able to accomplish the task despite tough encounters. 
Approximately 2500 soldiers and rebels were killed, and more than 7000 personnel 
injured during these confrontations. The Tamil Tigers who lost their bastion in Jaffna 
were furious and they responded equally when they overran the isolated Mullathivu 
Army Camp—a former LTTE strong hold.95 The reinforcement operations launched were 
also terminated as the Special Forces suffered unprecedented casualties, when they could 
not negotiate the situation at Mullathivu due to lack of air and the naval support.96 In fact, 
the depleted fleets of the Air Force and the Navy were barely sufficient to meet such 
demanding situations. The incident once again highlighted the lack of coordination of the 
three forces and inability of the defense policy to reorganize the forces in such debacles.  
While the Sri Lankan Police were incapable of ensuring public security, the 
military continuously failed to maintain security in the country and most of the military 
maneuvers were conducted with the purpose of gaining ground with some kind of 
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underlying political interest. In the same era, in a pre-election rally held in Colombo, a 
LTTE woman cadre carried out a suicide attack on President Chandrika Bandaranayake 
Kumaranathunge. She miraculously escaped but lost her right-eye to the explosion.97 
By the year 2000, due to exhaustion and depleted strength, the military was in a 
state of frustration. In mid-2000, the government started fresh negotiations for peace 
brokered by the Norwegians, along with a cease fire. Violating the ceasefire, the LTTE 
carried out a massive attack on the strategic Elephant Pass Camp, once again, and 
advanced further North, posing a serious threat to the entire military deployed in the 
Jaffna peninsula. However, they were driven back with greatest the difficulty by the 
military. 
In 2001, the Air Force suffered a severe blow when LTTE Black Tigers attacked 
the strategic Katunayake Air Base and the adjoining Bandaranayke International Airport, 
which resulted in the destruction of billions of dollars’ worth of military aircraft and 
civilian jet airliners (all the latest Airbus aircraft), leading to a severe economic down 
turn in the country.98 
To avoid a no confidence motion against the government and citing failures in 
conducting the war and resultant economic downfalls, President Bandaranayke dissolved 
the parliament, and fresh elections were held on December 5, 2001, which resulted in a 
change of the government.99As had been usual with all previous governments, the newly 
elected United National Party government also pledged negotiations with the LTTE for 
peace. As a result, a Norwegian brokered peace process got underway, and a new 
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ceasefire agreement (CFA) was announced on February 22, 2002,100 which became the 
longest observed ceasefire in the history of the Eelam War story. This marked the end of 
the Eelam War III.  
Developments that occurred afterwards were not so favorable for the already 
exhausted armed forces. While the military was strictly restricted to the barracks, the 
political leadership never appreciated the sacrifice made by the armed forces for many 
years in the battlefield. Instead, inspired by the ceasefire, the government neglected the 
military and even introduced budget cuts to reduce expenditures.101 In this context, the 
new government was not interested in professionalizing the military through training, and 
it significantly cut down on new recruitments and concentrated solely on the ceasefire. 
The initiatives of the new government created discomfort among the military, but it 
absorbed these silently, being subordinate to the government. 
4. EELAM WAR IV  
Eelam War IV was a period of determination, unsurpassed patriotism, joint 
endeavor, outstanding military leadership and the display of battle-hardened soldiership 
of the armed forces of Sri Lanka. The election of President Mahinda Rajapakse to the 
highest seat of the country as president of Sri Lanka on November 19, 2005, turned the 
fortune of the ruthless LTTE upside down when he directed the armed forces to eliminate 
the LTTE and unite the country through great character and perseverance. Eelam War IV 
was not negotiated effortlessly without bloodshed, but it proved to be of value for the 
blood that soldiers shed in the battle field at all fronts. For the LTTE, Eelam IV was a 
period of ruthlessness, martyrdom and display of the highest caliber of conventional 
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ability of ground, air and sea warfare as the insurgent force was finally reduced to ashes 
in the face of a superior battleship guided by superior force and leadership.102 
In first few months of the Rajapakse government, the LTTE played the same 
game that they had played with previous governments—negotiation and peace talks. The 
president did not want to waste time. While negotiating peace talks wholeheartedly he 
hurriedly revamped the military mechanism of the country for his next option, 
transforming the exhausted military into a patriotic force to function effectively under 
democratic civilian control as never before. For the transformation process, the measures 
that the government adopted may not be similar to other countries, and sometimes the 
initiatives were controversial and unique. (These initiatives will be discussed in a later 
chapter of the study.)  
From the beginning of 2006, while escalating their demands at the negotiation 
table, the LTTE stepped up claymore mine attacks and attacks on public transport all over 
the country with their widespread suicide network, killing hundreds of innocent civilians. 
This intensified matters for the government. The LTTE officially pulled out from peace 
talks indefinitely, creating deep skepticism, and they carried out a suicide attack on the 
Commander of the Army, killing 08 soldiers of the commander’s security squad. The 
army commander narrowly escaped fatal injuries.103 The government remained patient, 
but the closing of Mavil Aru sluice gates104—a major irrigation canal situated in the 
East—compelled it to proceed with the military option, which marked the 
commencement of the Eelam War IV.105  
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Having carefully selected the theaters of battle, the Ministry of Defense focused 
the military specifically on the East, covering a vast area of Mavil Aru, Sampur, and 
Thoppigala. This was effective and drove out the LTTE from the East by July 11, 2007. 
Liberating the East was historical because it was under the control of the LTTE for many 
years. This proved the commitment of the national leadership, correct strategic planning, 
timely directives, and coordination of military forces, on the ground, all of which had 
rarely been displayed during the past several years.106 
Military success in the East and the new government’s genuine commitment 
toward curbing LTTE terrorism in the country drove a considerable amount of youth to 
join the armed forces enabling expansion of the armed forces. Following a new multi-
front strategy, the ground, air and naval forces started operations in the Wanni region 
(northern Sri Lanka) subsequent to liberation of the East. In spite of stiff resistance of the 
LTTE, the Sri Lankan military advanced toward the North closely backed by the state 
defense leadership, capturing LTTE strong holds one by one and pushing the LTTE 
toward the Mullativu jungles and the northeastern coast of the island.107 The 
confrontations in the Wanni battle fronts were heavy. Realizing the intensity, the Air 
Force engaged to the highest magnitude with recently upgraded platforms and weapon 
delivery systems, and above all, was operated by a more dedicated aircrew utilizing new 
tactics acquired through training.108  
In this stage of the war, the military had to face the challenge of taking care of 
internally displaced personnel (IDP) due to the offensive operations, and the Ministry of 
Defense took pains to minimize civilian casualties by introducing no-fire zones and 
limiting the use of heavy artillery and air attacks.109 Eelam War IV also displayed the 
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LTTE’s conventional air and sea force abilities. While it challenged the professional Sri 
Lankan Navy at sea with its suicide, sea-tiger attacks, the LTTE’s rudimentary air force 
conducted ten air attacks on Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) bases, army facilities and 
economic centers of gravity, creating a huge impact on the economy. On February 20, 
2009, while the army was inching toward making a final attack, the LTTE carried out two 
suicide air missions, one reaching the capital city of Colombo and the other to SLAF base 
at Katunayake where most of the fleet of fighter jets was housed.110 Both missions missed 
the intended targets due to the activation of the air defense system.  
The final battle of the Eelam War was fought in May 2009 by the Sri Lankan 
military against stiff resistance of the LTTE, concentrating at a narrow strip of land in the 
Nandikadal area on the east coast. The final battle was emotionally difficult for the 
military as the LTTE used civilians as human shields.111 At this stage of the war, there 
was intense international pressure on the government to terminate the war. However, the 
government very firmly upheld its decision to continue with the war. While the military 
was closely guided on the final mission, special forces were utilized to penetrate the 
LTTE fortification where civilians were held.112 The Special Forces succeeded with few 
casualties and rescued more than 200,000 civilian hostages of the ruthless LTTE. The 
final battle came to an end on May 18, 2009 when all the fronts from different axis 
reached Nandikaddal victoriously. This culminated the three decades of sweat and blood 
by the military to save the country. The president on May 19, 2009, officially announced 
the victory of the civil war and the death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the 
LTTE, who was instrumental in ravaging the country for three decades—while extending 
his gratitude and the gratitude of the whole nation to the armed forces of Sri Lanka for 
ending terrorism.  
                                                 
110 “The Last-Night-Flight: Security Forces Nail LTTE’s Rudimentary Air Wing,” Ministry of 
Defense-Sri Lanka, accessed on November 23, 2012, 
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090221_09.  
111 Michael Roberts, “Blackmail During the Endgame in Eelam War IV,” Colombo Telegraph April 
11, 2012, accessed on December 02, 2012, http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/blackmail-during-
the-endgame-in-eelam-war-iv/. 
112 VK Shashikuma, “Lessons from the War in Sri Lanka,” Indian Defense Review, 2009. Vol. 24.3 
Jul-Sep. accessed on December 02, 2012. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/lessons-from-
the-war-in-sri-lanka/. 
 47
In contemporary history, no developing country like Sri Lanka has ever built up a 
large armed force, maintained democratic control, not faced a coup, and fought against 
terrorism successfully. Against that background, the next chapter examines the methods 
and measures adopted by the government of Sri Lanka toward establishing democratic 
control of civil-military relations during Eelam War IV.  
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE WAR, AND HOW IT 
GUIDED MILITARY TO WIN THE WAR (EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN 
CONTROL) 
1. Revamping the Ministry of Defense (MOD)  
Unlike previous national leaders of Sri Lanka, President Mahinda Rajapakse’s 
concept and approach toward waging war as the national leader was radical and 
pragmatic.113 His significant political experience114 and broad thinking enabled him to 
understand the necessity of introducing a major revamp in the entire military mechanism 
to wage war against the LTTE. For that matter, the introduction of a new institutional 
process effective for Sri Lanka is most uncommon compared to other countries. 
Having identified the importance of a strong institutionalism115 for streamlining 
CMR and wage war against LTTE effectively, President Rajapakse decided first to 
solidify military planning. Immediately after coming to power, the president himself 
swore in as Minister of Defense, taking the strategic MOD under his control—
empowering the MOD to become more decisive. The new appointment reduced a tier in 
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the decision making process and ensured swift and firm decision making. As the national 
leader, the president stood firm with decisions he made pertaining to the war against 
terrorism. To establish proper coordination between the political leadership and the 
military, he appointed his own brother, Gotabaya Rajapakse, a talented retired military 
officer as the Secretary of Defense.116 President had faith and confidence on Gotabaya 
and his decision to appoint him to the top administrative post played a pivotal role in 
guiding the war according to a calculated time plan. As Secretary of Defense, Gotabaya 
Rajapakse was the critical interface between the armed forces and the President but he 
never involved himself in party politics.117 His role as a senior most administrative officer 
in the MOD eliminated unnecessary delays in addressing critical and strategically 
important decision-making moments throughout the war such as deciding on air 
interdictions and counter attacks.  
Since the MOD was under close supervision by his close confidant, the president 
rested assured that his decisions were implemented adequately without flaw. The classic 
coordination established through the revised structure positively influenced the flow in 
the decision making process of the national leadership, which in turn enhanced timely, 
military, operational planning. That made a positive impact on tactical-level activities in 
the fierce battle ground.  
 In principle, the MOD in Sri Lanka is a civilian dominated organization, 
adequately coordinated by senior military staff headed by the Secretary Defense. Even 
during the restructuring processes the said balance has not been disturbed, and no military 
influence has overpassed the civilian hierarchy. The MOD in Sri Lanka is structured into 
seven divisions for handling different areas of responsibility of security, and all these 
divisions are headed by civilians. Further, the said senior administrators are empowered 
to draft policy and strategy in relevant areas of their responsibility. This can be related to  
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the function of the Spanish MOD, which operates with three major blocks.118 The 
civilians employed in the MOD of Sri Lanka are appointed by the Sri Lanka 
Administrative Services, and they enjoy career opportunities similar to other government 
administrative service servants working in different departments. However, limited 
numbers of staff appointments at the MOD (not more than 15% of the staff positions) 
including the Secretary Defense are held by retired senior military/police officers—that 
has not been detrimental to the political control. The selection criteria of these officers for 
appointments at the MOD are based on merit and prominence that they have achieved 
during their careers, and are only hand-picked. Although, their tenures of duty have not 
been restricted by any specific criteria, the present situation indicates termination of 
appointments within a period of five years. However, these appointments are open for 
any person who is qualified, and the government has increased opportunities by opening 
more training institutions encouraging civilians to master the field. (This will be 
discussed in a later paragraph.) Further, by observance it is understood that presently 
serving civilians whom have been recruited with security background have maintained a 
balanced approach toward the assigned tasks without being biased to military branches 
that they have represented.  
The national leadership of Sri Lanka believed a solid hierarchy was a fundamental 
requirement for the military to be effective in the war. This had not been the case in the 
last twenty years of the Eelam War during which the government of Sri Lanka failed 
repeatedly. In that sense, President Rajapakse’s foremost initiative was to appoint the 
right people for the right job in the military on the basis of performance and bravery in 
battle, rather than depending on formal seniority structures or political affiliations. In that 
way, he established an efficiency and effectiveness that had been lacking for years.119 
The best example in this context is the appointment of a senior Air Force officer as the 
Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS) to lead the war effort at a strategic/policy level in an 
army heavy military environment already in place. As the Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces, the president appointed warriors to command the three forces and never 
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interfered with their battle plans.120 He did, however, constantly review and encourage 
them with necessary guidance to lead the battle as per timely targets selected by the 
military, not by the political hierarchy. Non-interference by the political hierarchy 
permitted military commanders to contribute innovative thinking for battle planning. 
With guidance of the CDS it was in this period Sri Lanka utilized air force for the battle 
effectively, that brought quick results, and was a direct outcome of innovative thinking. 
The non-interference in military planning was a prized quality in the Commander in 
Chief and it enhanced confidence and subordination of the military commanders and 
importantly the combat effectiveness. Further, it led to better control of the military and 
improved civil-military relations in the country. In the history of the civil war in Sri 
Lanka, political motives had disturbed solid military plans in many instances.  
2. Affecting Structural Changes  
Learning from prior setbacks,121 the government realized the importance of 
effecting structural changes in the military as a necessity to face the ever-increasing 
threat of the LTTE. Therefore, it authorized a two-fold increase of manpower of the 
military from its previous strength, and the launch of a massive recruitment drive.122 The 
intention of the government was to concentrate and deliver maximum possible thrust 
within a short period and eradicate terrorism as soon as possible. Inspired by the 
President’s patriotic speeches the new recruitment drive was fruitful as many patriotic 
youth joined the armed forces to serve the nation. The new recruitments enhanced the 
military with an additional 85,000 personnel within a span of two years (from 2006 to 
2008).123 This overwhelming turnout helped a military depleted in battle strengths for  
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many years. It not only ensured major structural changes in the organization of the 
military but created new task forces and reorganized depleted battle fronts124 all of which 
boosted the morale of the forces. 
While the aforesaid reforms were underway, the MOD introduced another 
structural change in the armed forces that allowed the establishment of larger forces for 
ground operations within the Sri Lanka Air Force. This became known as the air force 
regiment.125 
Although the regiment concept was similar to that of the Royal Air Force126, its role and 
task was not limited to airfield defense. Its role was similar to that of infantry in the 
regular army. Similarly, in the Sri Lanka Navy a ground defense element was formed, 
Naval Patrolmen Branch,127 to perform infantry tasks. In addition, special forces units 
were also formed as branches in both the Air Force and the Navy. In the air force, the 
special force element was known as the air force regiment special forces. In the navy, the 
special force element was known as the special boat squadron. Later, in the battle against 
the LTTE, all said forces were effectively maneuvered by the Joint Operations 
Headquarters for various tasks on the ground and at sea in addition to formal army 
operations, which strengthened the overall war effort. These initiatives improved combat 
effectiveness of the military in the battlefield from many folds. The battle successes of 
each armed force were well appreciated by the government and it boosted morale of the 
armed forces and dedication to the job assigned further. The armed forces with boosted 
morale never step back or ignore government directions during challenging situations and  
 
 
                                                 
124 Ranil Wijayapala, “Victory Achieved through Sacrifice,” Daily News June 03, 2009, accessed on 
November 27, 2012, http://www.dailynews.lk/2009/06/03/supstory.asp?id=s02. 
125 Shamindra Ferdinando, “SLAF Regiment’s Role in Defeating Terrorism,” The Island Online, 
accessed on November 27, 2012, http://www.island.lk/2009/06/24/news28.html. 
126 Royal Air Force Regiment is the ground fighting force of the Royal Air Force. It is a diverse 
organization that provides first-rate worldwide force protection to UK air assets. Its officers and gunners 
have been deployed on operational service since the establishment of the formation in 1942 and have a 
proud history. “The RAF Regiment,” accessed on Nov 27, 2012, http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafregiment/.  
127 “Sri Lanka Navy - Amphibious Operations,” Global Security.Org, accessed on November 27, 
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the loyalty generated kept them intact throughout the war without any defection. The said 
initiatives enhanced civil-military relations, and stand unique to Sri Lanka compared to 
other countries.  
Meeting the manpower demand operating multiple fronts in the battle field and, 
simultaneously, securing border villages adjoining the front lines was an impossible task 
for the military itself. The LTTE had already infiltrated each and every vulnerable point 
in the island. There was no way that the military could cope with such a deep-rooted 
network. To address the situation, the government introduced another change in the 
defense sector that allowed utilization of police personnel in extended roles other than 
routine policing. This necessitated that the police department be brought under the 
purview of the MOD.128 Under new regulations, the police were deployed in limited anti-
terrorist operations. This proved useful in securing non-conflict areas.  
In addition, to strengthening the police force, an effective force of voluntary 
civilians, mostly recruited from the border villages was established. The new force was 
created under a special provision of the MOD called the Civil Defense Force129 (CDF), 
and it was entrusted with maintaining the security of threatened border villages. The CDF 
was trained in military training centers per the directives of the MOD, and was issued 
with automatic weapons commensurate to the threat encountered. The CDF later played a 
significant role in the war, securing the border villages with the police. These newly 
introduced institutional changes were home grown and redrew the routine structural 
framework and functions of the MOD. As a whole, the new initiatives helped to 
strengthen the defense mechanism in Sri Lanka in a different format compared to other 
countries—and the enhanced civil-military relations helped immensely to fight the war 
effectively.  
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3. Professionalizing the Military 
The president, as an experienced politician who had seen and lived through the 
war for many years, was well aware in what manner the LTTE behaved. To face this 
enemy under the newly appointed military leadership, his government believed in 
professionalizing130 the military. As the first step to make the military expertise, geared 
all the military training centers to carry out mission-oriented training programs on 
counterrevolutionary tactics. Most of the training centers were reorganized to conduct 
cross-service training, allowing the critical elements of the three forces’ personnel to 
undergo training on multiple combat skills at the training centers of each service to 
improve joint operational capability. While other counter parts fought the war in actual 
battle grounds, the training centers in rear areas met the training demands required to 
expertise the troops to counter changing tactics of the LTTE.  
The MOD ensured senior officers and others of the level of mission commanders 
were provided with exposure in democratic friendly foreign countries like USA and India 
to gain specialist knowledge on civil-military relations. The syllabuses of the local staff 
colleges of the armed forces were revised to impart knowledge on civil-military relations. 
This was materialized through posting of officers who have undergone training on civil-
military relations in foreign countries and tasking them to design and incorporate 
knowledge on democratic civilian control of military as a subject in to the syllabus. 
Before the said revision military has not considered civil-military relations as an 
important subject under military training. Further, MOD has allowed civilian officers of 
senior administrative level to join the Defense Services Command and Staff College and 
obtain degrees in defense studies. This has extended the field of civil-military relations to 
different intellectuals of the country. The latest move toward professionalizing the 
personnel involved in national security has been the upgrading of Kothalawala Defence 
                                                 
130 The primary task of the military is management of violence, and it is a unique skill that 
distinguishes the military different from other civilian professions. In a democratic environment the 
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Academy131 to the status of a university allowing the civilians to become professionals in 
the field of national security administration. 
Creating a sense of responsibility, which is also an important element of 
professionalizing among the armed forces, has been a relatively easy task for the 
government of Sri Lanka. Since the inception of the armed forces in the country, it has 
behaved loyal and responsible to any government in power, and hence no major 
adjustment was required in that area. However, through the MOD government made clear 
their intentions and the responsibility of the armed forces—to win the war and defeat 
terrorism. Similarly government made no significant attempt to improve the important 
determinant—corporateness needed for professionalizing military as they viewed Sri 
Lanka armed forces has displayed adequate level of corporateness during its engagement 
in the prolonged war for many years without any defection. These were encouraging 
factors for the government in its effort of professionalizing the military. As a whole, all 
of such initiatives improved professionalism of the military and related civilian 
counterparts at an accelerated pace thanks to the timely directives of the government. In 
the decisive war, these elements became effective contributory factors that enhanced 
civil-military relations in the country.  
4. Taking Over the Ministry of Finance to Support the War Effort 
Another significant initiative in the institutionalization process particular to Sri 
Lankan civil-military relations was the takeover of the Ministry of Finance by the 
president himself in addition to his portfolio as the Minister of Defense.132 President 
Mahinda Rajapakse at a very early stage identified the need of providing necessary 
budgetary support for the military as a critical element for the successful conduct of the 
                                                 
131 General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University (KDU) is the only university offering graduate 
courses in defense studies in the South Asian region. As a member of the Association of Commonwealth 
Universities (United Kingdom), the university maintains world class standards for educating and grooming 
Officer Cadets to successfully meet the challenges of modern defense management. “General Sir John 
Kothalawala Defence University,” accessed on January 13, 2013, http://www.kdu.ac.lk/#.  
132 As per the constitution of the country President of Sri Lanka can serve multiple terms in the office 
of presidency and hold different ministries as per his discretion for the betterment of the country. The 
Constitution of Sri Lanka- Chapter VII (The Central Executive,) accessed on January 24, 2013. 
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war. As a developing nation with a high budget deficit, Sri Lanka continuously funding a 
war was considered an overwhelming waste of national income by many critics. Sri 
Lanka spent 3.7% of its GDP on the military, which was the highest percentage reported 
in the region.133 Despite criticism by Western governments and agencies like World 
Bank134 the national leadership decided to fund an all-out war against the LTTE, and to 
that effect the president’s leadership as the Minister of Finance and Planning was crucial.  
Providing adequate finances at a critical juncture of the war allowed the sophisticated 
military inventories to run smoothly, and it undoubtedly energized the military.135 This is 
a marked difference compared to other militaries in the world, which suffer from 
budgetary restrictions that curtail some sound plans, and it can be considered as a 
noteworthy initiative that Sri Lanka has adopted to strengthen civil-military relations in 
the country. 
5. Establishing Guidelines on the Role of Media and Utilization of Media 
to Rally Public Support 
During the thirty-year history of the civil war in Sri Lanka, the military had 
experienced numerous situations where it had been compelled to abandon promising war 
plans due to various domestic and foreign political pressures.136 Most of these pressures 
forced through the media. In this regard, President Rajapakse had a simple message to the 
armed forces—their job was only to fight and win the war. He promised to look after any 
political fallout from the engagement, both domestic and international.137 
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The national leadership understood importance of media for uninterrupted 
conduct of the war and, therefore, established a special institution called the Media 
Centre for National Security (MCNS)138 to direct media conduct related to the war. 
Vested with adequate powers to direct the media, MCNS managed the flow of news, 
providing accurate accounts of the war and establishing required firewalls against foreign 
and local media agencies biased toward the LTTE. This institutionalization effort was an 
important endeavor by the national leadership, which successfully controlled spread of 
false propaganda against the country and the war effort. 
 During battle, local and foreign media and pressure groups raised numerous 
allegations against Sri Lankan armed forces to demoralize them and divert their attention. 
However, the national leadership, with the newly established MCNS, confidently 
countered all such allegations, enabling the military to stay focused on its objective.139 
While previous governments succumbed before international pressures and changed their 
military strategies at crucial junctures, the present government in decisive situations stood 
firm ordering the military to fight the battle per the military plan uninterruptedly, and this 
posture of the government improved military confidence and the civil-military relations, 
in particular.  
Another classic role played by the MCNS was the giant media campaign launched 
under the theme of “Api Wenuwen Api Wemu”140 (Be Together for All), which created 
public awareness of the dedicated service of the armed forces. It stressed the 
responsibility of the entire nation to stand by the forces and respect and appreciate their 
meritorious service to the nation. Further, President Rajapakse foresaw the importance of 
rallying public support in order to continue the war uninterruptedly. Toward that end, the 
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president used his convincing speeches and directed the MCNS to launch an effective 
media campaign to uplift the morale of the masses and regenerate an important “lost 
national will” of the country. While he generated the national will of the public, the 
MCNS portrayed the unified commitment of the country to the outside world to explain 
and gain international support to wage the war.141 With effective utilization of the 
MCNS, the government was able to build faith of the entire nation in the military, which 
stood extend improved civil-military relations in the country.  
6. Revamping Diplomatic Prowess to Support the War 
The next concern of the national leadership was revamping diplomatic prowess to 
fight against Tamil diaspora and other international elements impeding the war effort. Sri 
Lanka’s Foreign Service was in a dilapidated condition, which hardly supported the war 
effort over many years of conflict. Although diplomacy may not be obviously seen as 
linked to civil-military relations, its indirect effect had great influence on the conduct of 
the war in Sri Lanka. Realizing the importance of diplomatic missions abroad, the 
president appointed capable officials replacing dormant diplomats, and revamped the 
diplomatic service of the country. Through this refurbished mechanism with more 
effective channels, the government was able to answer countless issues raised by pro-
LTTE Western countries that made various allegations against the Sri Lankan Military.142 
The revamped diplomatic prowess played an impressive role throughout the war under 
the guidance of the president in overcoming militarily targeted external pressures 
mounted on the government of Sri Lanka. These pressures included immediate 





                                                 
141 Nitin Gokhale, “Sri Lanka: Winning the War on Two Fronts,” Live Mint and the Wall Street 
Journal. June 30, 2009, accessed on November 27, 2012, 
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/eQeG5xEPZNfkJ5syAJFf6I/Sri-Lanka-winning-the-war-on-two-
fronts.html. 
142 Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam War, 124. 
 58
Eelam War, pressures mounted by powerful countries terminated military offensives by 
the government—creating displeasure among the military.143 It created adverse effect on 
civil-military relations of the country.  
While diplomatic negotiations with Western countries were important, 
maintaining a cordial relationship with the closest neighbor, India, was also crucial for 
the war effort. India had already intervened in several instances in Sri Lanka’s civil war 
due to the interests of the Tamil community living in India’s state of Tamil Nadu. With 
this background, the government of Sri Lanka utilized its diplomatic mechanism 
extensively to convince India to wage war against the LTTE.144 Unlike other national 
leaders, President Rajapakse did not agitate India for any reason. He always tried to 
accommodate and yield to India’s interests while being firm on the Sri Lankan position in 
conflicting issues. As a whole, the restyled diplomatic missions were able to handle all 
the international pressures India included, smoothly. Diplomatic missions provided 
plausible intelligence to intercept major LTTE arms shipments successfully at sea during 
the war.145 
Later in the war, the revamped diplomatic mechanism closely coordinated the 
tracking down of top LTTE cadres hiding in safe heavens in international territories, too. 
The firm stand on international pressure by the national leadership, made possible 
through the revamped diplomatic mechanism, made the task of the military easy. It 
allowed the military to stay focused on predetermined military objectives free from 
political interference diverting or terminating the mission, unlike in the past. This effort 
by the political hierarchy was highly appreciated by the military—allowing it to achieve 
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decisive gains on the battleground, which increased faith of the military toward the 
government day by day and led to better civil-military relations. 
D. POST-WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE SRI LANKA ARMED 
FORCES 
The victorious termination of the civil war in 2009 and establishment of peace in 
the country has obviously shifted the roles and missions of the armed forces in Sri Lanka. 
Since the establishment of the army in Sri Lanka in 1949, along with independence of the 
country the mission of the armed forces has been defense and safeguarding the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the country. Although, not been amended constitutionally, at 
present the roles of the military have been substantially shifted by the government to 
accomplish post-war challenges of reconciliation. The country’s concerns of 
incorporating regional security aspects for derivation of future mission of the armed 
forces have come to the limelight. The ever-increasing importance of security of the 
Indian Ocean region146 and the expansion of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has 
become the contributory factors influencing the incorporation of regional security to 
reformulate the mission of the armed forces of Sri Lanka. Therefore, in the current 
context, the mission of the Sri Lanka armed forces will remain central to the idea of 
defense and safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country with the 
added interest of security of the Indian Ocean region.  
Since the inception of the armed forces of Sri Lanka, their macro role has 
remained under the dominant context of “defender of the nation” in a relatively peaceful 
environment, unthreatened by external enemies as an island nation located in the Indian 
Ocean. Therefore, the role of the Sri Lankan Military has been mostly ceremonial with 
limited strength and resources. Except for its mobilization to clamp down on internal riots 
in 1971, the armed forces have hardly been called upon to perform in any instance in 
history until they were called for duty under emergency regulations in response to the 
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LTTE uprising. Since the engagement in insurgency warfare in the 1980s, the military 
has transformed itself from ceremonial status to the role of “defender of the nation,” and 
has performed the dedicated role of safeguarding the country untiringly for almost three 
decades.  
After winning the war and uniting the country under one flag, the government was 
conscious of not leaving the purposefully expanded 400,000 troops idle. As Paul 
Shemella says147 a government with wisdom should do, the government of Sri Lanka has 
refocused its armed forces onto fresh roles without retiring its soldiers to barracks or 
demobilizing them. Instead, they have been actively engaged in duties other than their 
formal role to accomplish post-war challenges of reconciliation. While maintaining a 
sizable balance of forces ready for deployment in national emergencies, the armed forces 
have been entrusted with a wide array of tasks connected to national development. It has 
gradually shifted the stance of the armed forces from the macro role148 of nation defender 
to the role of nation builder, participating in multiple micro roles149 of national interest in 
a broader concept.  
It is observed that, in recent years, countries less disturbed by external or internal 
threats and with relative stability make significant adjustments to the macro roles of their 
militaries, creating conditions to utilize the armed forces in more effective ways. As an 
example, Argentina having participated in the Persian Gulf War as an ally with the U.S., 
switched the macro role of war fighters to peace keeping, and later became a leading 
nation involved in peace keeping in the world.150 
In this context, the approach of Sri Lanka has been somewhat different. Although 
the government of Sri Lanka has stated its continuous support to provide troops to United 
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Nations Peace Keeping Missions around the world,151 it has not made any positive 
attempt to increase its troop contributions, especially after the end of the civil war. 
Although providing troops for peace keeping is prestigious, and monetary-wise a 
lucrative engagement for developing country like Sri Lanka, the government has 
restricted its contribution to a contingent of 1200 soldiers who are presently deployed in 
the Republic of Haiti and Lebanon.152 Therefore, even after the war, Sri Lanka has not 
made any positive move toward becoming a peace keeping nation a move that might have 
changed the macro role of the military to peace keeping. This indicates the government of 
Sri Lanka’s interest in retaining a large force within the country for its contingencies 
rather than deploying soldiers overseas in UN missions for economic gain or prestige.153 
By the end of the Eelam War IV, the government of Sri Lanka came across 
another humanitarian issue of paramount importance—the issue of IDPs produced as a 
result of confrontations that reached the total of 300,000. The government without 
hesitation tasked the military to lead the gigantic task of providing facilities of food, 
accommodation and, welfare for the displaced, and for that matter, constructing two 
welfare villages in Menik Farm west of Vavuniya believed to be the largest IDP camp 
functioned in the world.154 While the military put its heart and soul into fulfilling this 
task, it provided the required manpower and expertise to build the infrastructure and 
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establish the village in the shortest time span and later administer it to the highest 
standards with the participation of civilian authorities.155 
Another micro role that the Sri Lankan military has been vitally assigned by the 
MOD is humanitarian demining. During thirty years of brutal war, the LTTE utilized an 
unprecedented amount of anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, and different kinds of 
improvised explosive devices to confront armed forces. Large quantities of unexploded 
explosive devices are believed to be in every area of former, LTTE occupation in the 
north and east conflict zones.  
In this scenario, ensuring safety and providing a mine-free environment for re-
settlers in their original home places was a complex issue. Ensuring a mine-free 
environment prior to resettlement was given highest priority by the government, and 
realizing the gravity and complexity of the task, the government engaged the military 
along with some foreign action groups to undertake this vital task. In this engagement, 
the military’s macro role as humanitarian de-miners has been highly successful, which 
has made the resettlement program of IDP’s in Sri Lanka a reality. Further, the demining 
program has been carried out in stages and, so far, the de-miners have been able to 
complete the priority stages of towns, villages, and agricultural areas. Their next task is to 
concentrate on forest areas, a project that may run in-to a few more years.156 
Rehabilitation and reintegrating of ex-LTTE cadres into the society was another 
micro role performed by the military in the post war reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. 
During the last stages of the war, over 12000 LTTE cadres—including 594 child 
soldiers—have been apprehended or have surrendered to the military, and these cadres 
with different levels of involvement in terrorism needed careful screening, grading, 
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identifying, and directing through a proper rehabilitation process.157 Due to severe 
indoctrination, the rehabilitation needed expertise and close supervision, so the military, 
utilizing its inherent training capabilities along with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and 
assistance of various organizations including the UN, has undertaken the grueling task 
since mid-2009. By 2012, the military had successfully accomplished this sensitive task 
and has been able to reintegrate close to 10,900 rehabilitees back to civil society, having 
duly transformed as productive citizens with added competence in a profession of their 
interest to make their living. The government’s attainment of these targets in 
rehabilitating indoctrinated cadres in a short period is a result of direct utilization of the 
military along with the Ministry of Rehabilitation.158 
In the list of priorities of the reconciliation process, the government found that 
rebuilding infrastructure in the war-ravaged north and east was important in uplifting 
social life. For that matter, the same necessity prevailed in other areas too in the country. 
To effect developments at an accelerated phase, the government utilized the battle-proven 
military for the micro-role of civil construction. The military, sufficiently armed with 
expertise, organization, machinery, and target-oriented culture, has proven itself in that 
particular sector, too, by building more than 7000 housing units and renovating over 
6000 houses damaged during the war, all of this earlier than expected. They have 
undertaken such major tasks as reconstructing bridges and roads, re-laying the northern 
and Mannar railroads, and developing war-affected remote towns, allowing civilian 
agencies to follow them to accomplish major tasks at an accelerated phase.159 In addition, 
the contribution of the military to infrastructure development in the capital city of  
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Colombo has been incredible. The present city of Colombo is cleaner, landscaped and has 
been beautified as a direct result of the engagement of the military by the government in 
the role of civil construction.160 
To promote economic activities in former war-affected areas, the military has 
been employed in economic activities such as managing major farm yards and cattle 
farms, turning much unused infertile land into income-generating ventures.161 Many 
rehabilitated, ex-LTTE cadres have been enrolled in the Civil Defense Force (CDF),162 
and some of them contribute labor to the management of farm lands in reviving the north 
and east after the war—which has provided a comprehensive source of income for the 
rehabilitated, ex-LTTE cadres and an added strength to the gross food production of the 
country.163 
The military’s micro-role in economic ventures has been further extended to 
multimillion dollar projects to support the re-blooming tourism sector, which had been 
one of the key income generating industries in the country prior to the civil war. The 
army has been allowed to build and operate three, star class tourist resorts under the 
brand name of “LAYA,” which also employ civilians from the highest class in the 
hospitality trade. This has generated considerable number of direct and indirect job 
opportunities and revenue to strengthen the national economy.164 In addition, the Sri 
Lankan Army has moved to the lucrative air-travel trade by establishing its own travel 
agency—Air Travel Services (Pvt) Limited—to support the tourism industry and to cater 
to the growing numbers of local pilgrims who visit India and Mecca after the civil war.165 
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The Sri Lankan Air Force, too, contributes to the economic micro-role of the military 
through multiple ventures. The SLAF has established “Heli-tours,”166 their commercial 
flying arm under the companies act, and provides safe air transport to any destination in 
the country utilizing a dedicated fleet of fixed wing and rotor-wing aircraft. This 
promotes tourism in Sri Lanka. In the east coast capital of Trincomalee, the SLAF 
manages a state-of-the-art Holiday Resort at Marble Beach, and a world-class golf links, 
which have also become profitable ventures.167 
Last, but not least, the Sri Lankan military has been assigned a role in the 
diplomatic service. Since completion of the civil war, the government has taken measures 
to strengthen the diplomatic machinery of the country and has appointed a considerable 
number of qualified senior military officers to various levels of diplomatic careers in 
foreign missions. The intention of the government is to establish a more active diplomatic 
service capable of countering the powerful propaganda activities of the still-active Tamil 
diaspora in other countries directed at damaging the image of the country.168 
Although it is only three years since the end of the civil war, this chapter 
describes the variations effected in the macro and the micro-roles of the armed forces by 
the government of Sri Lanka. The government has understood the gravity and potential 
liabilities of an idle force, which had been at one time fully mobilized. As a country that 
has been derailed due to prolong effects of terrorism, Sri Lanka’s rapid recovery in a post 
war scenario would be a difficult challenge unless supported by robust initiatives. The 
changes that have been effected in the roles and mission of the Sri Lankan armed forces 
are a direct result of that challenge. However, they might generate many positive and 
negative consequences in the long run. 
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E. POST-WAR CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE COUNTRY 
The post-civil war civil-military relations in Sri Lanka indicate a relatively stable 
and strengthened outlook in the medium term under the current political leadership. The 
GoSL has been able to maintain democratic civilian control over the military during the 
period of civil war while making it effective to defeat terrorism and unite the country. In 
the aftermath of the war, in a peaceful environment, the government has shifted the focus 
of the military from its previous status as defender of the nation to one of nation builder, 
focused on future challenges of the country.  
To establish civil-military relations in a country the existence of a stable polity is 
a prerequisite and the present government in power since 2005 led by President 
Rajapakse has been able to maintain the required political stability. That has enabled the 
government to effect changes in the military mechanism as per the necessity with 
confidence, and guide it to win the war.  
The political constancy of the Rajapakse Government was further emphasized 
during presidential elections held in 2010 subsequent to the civil war. The elections 
reflected his extraordinary popularity as he won 57.88% of the total votes—a significant 
improvement compared to the 2005 results, which accounted for 50.29% votes.169 The 
increasing popularity and majority power in the parliament has enabled the present 
government to repair any political hitches easily and maintain a stable legislative and 
executive control in the country. The credibility of the present government has been well 
understood by the armed forces, and it has remained subordinated without challenging 
the people’s power that has managed the country satisfactorily. To reciprocate, the 
government has not hesitated to praise and accolade the military for its yeomen service, 
which saved the nation from brutal terrorism after thirty years of costly war.170 This 
climate has created conditions for further strengthening civil-military relations in the 
country. Against that background, the remaining paragraphs briefly discuss how GoSL 
has managed civil-military relations in the post-war context. 
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The post-war approach to management of the military in Sri Lanka spans an 
extension of war-time initiatives introduced by the government. Following the same lines 
of success, the MOD still play the role of lead agency that links the powerful military to 
the political sphere. Compared to the other ministries of the government in the aftermath 
of the war the MOD in Sri Lanka assumes a powerful position in the legislative sphere 
and secures a priority position over others, is still led by the President as the Minister of 
Defense. Military success has further strengthened the position of the Secretary of 
Defense, and he continues to function as representative of the military in politics. In the 
post-war context, the role and the task of the MOD has been expanded with annexation of 
the Ministry of Urban Development to facilitate the task of nation building, and this may 
be a unique situation in contrast to any other MOD functioning in the world.171 The added 
work scope has empowered the MOD to undertake development tasks in the north and 
the east, as well as in other areas, with direct employment of the armed forces in 
development tasks. 
In the post-war scenario, few structural changes have been effected in the Sri 
Lankan army, navy and the air force. While discontinuing the task forces formed during 
the period of war, their strength has been absorbed into existing divisions and the newly 
formed Southern Division. By the end of the war, the army’s many operational divisions 
experienced depleted strengths due to heavy casualties, and the new initiative replenished 
the troop shortages of those divisions. The navy established a new South East Command 
to ensure the security of the southeastern seas of the country.172 The Air Force has 
enhanced its presence in the north by establishing air field units in two captured air fields 
of the LTTE with the intension of expanding those deployments into large complexes in 
the future.173 In the higher defense mechanism, the Joint Operational Headquarters has 
been renamed the Office of the Chief of Defense Staff, with added responsibility of the 
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newly formed Coast Guard.174 These minimal structural adjustments by the MOD have 
not created any drawbacks in the military command structure that may be detrimental for 
civil-military relations.  
The Sri Lankan Police Department, responsible for public policing and 
maintenance of civil security in the island, functioned under the purview of the MOD 
during the period of war. Even three years after the termination of war, no change has 
been effected to the line ministry of the police, and it still function under the explicit 
control of the MOD. However, after the civil war, public policing activities have been 
fully reinstated, and with diminished responsibilities pertaining to national security police 
has been fully engaged for maintaining internal security. Compared to the Sri Lankan 
military, the police maintain a poor track record in the aspect of corruption, and need 
considerable improvement. While much procedural streamlining has been introduced, the 
MOD has enhanced professionalizing the police through training to transform it in to an 
effective public service. Although, the Police Department in Sri Lanka functions under 
the MOD, it has not created any detrimental effect to the neutrality of police functions or, 
vis-à-vis, to the civil-military relations of the country so far. However, many interested 
local and international parties have highlighted the need to effect structural independence 
of the police to improve transparency. This is a prerequisite of a democracy, and needs 
immediate attention of the government.175 
The defense budget in Sri Lanka indicates an upward trend, and a higher 
percentage of GDP ($2.2 billion) allocated for 2013 compared to previous years indicates 
adequate spending on the military in post-war Sri Lanka.176 In practical terms, although 
considerable restrictions have been introduced to reduce military spending at organization 
levels, the government has favored providing same benefits to the entire military payroll 
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without restricting any of the incentives provided during the time of war. This initiative 
has kept the military in the same high spirits in the post-war period, too. Especially in the 
aftermath of the war the government has requested all other public and private 
institutions to provide the best possible and prioritized services to the war heroes 
whenever they seek their assistance. In a similar aspiration, the government has created 
awareness in drawing the respect of the general public of all spheres toward the military. 
It has glorified and elevated the esteem of the military encouraging military to remain 
loyal. Basically, the military is a prestige service in Sri Lanka. 
Most of the soldiers in the military represent the poorer social strata of the general 
population, and realizing this fact the government has introduced various programs to 
uplift the social standards of the soldiers and their families. The government has 
established a special agency called the Ranaviru Seva Authority to coordinate all such 
activities, and so far it has introduced a number of initiatives covering a wide scope of 
activities, such as the construction of full-fledged housing schemes for the military, 
construction of houses for needy war heroes on their own plots of land, allocation of 
lands to construct their own houses, providing loans for livelihood improvement, and 
providing a special provision for school entrance for the children of war heroes.177  
Apart from that, the critical attention of the government has been focused on 
looking after lifelong dependent war heroes who have been injured during the war. There 
are many facilities that have been built to take care of this segment of war heroes, and the 
government has been able to obtain wide popular support for further improvement of said 
facilities.178 The “Abimansala” and the “Mihindu Seth Medura” are such sanatorium-
type, lifetime care centers built for disabled war heroes.179 The government has indicated 
that caring of disabled war heroes is a duty of the government, as the whole nation owes 
them for their meritorious acts, which saved the country. Further, the government has 
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taken steps to honor the parents of war heroes who sacrificed their lives during the war 
through special schemes like “Ranaviru Ma-Piya Rekawarana,”180 which indicate the 
unwavering commitment of the government toward the welfare of the military.  
In summary, the GoSL has utilized moreover an incentive based approach for 
post-war management of civil-military relations. That has been successful so far, creating 
greater respect and adequate subordination of the military toward civilian control, 
minimizing any opportunity for friction between the civil supremacy and the military.  
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Ending the war and eradicating terrorism from a war-ravaged, island nation is a 
great achievement for Sri Lanka, and this study confirms that the said military 
accomplishment has distinctive linkage to civil-military relations. Winning the war has 
opened a new pathway for reestablishing democracy in the country, a pathway which had 
been severed for many decades. The Government of Sri Lanka has adopted some unique 
initiatives, different from other countries in the world, to guide the military to a winning 
strategy. Energized by the successful conclusion of the war, the government has largely 
depended on the military and utilized the military in post-war reconciliation activities, 
engaging it in an extended role. With this background and considering the arguments put 
forth in Chapters II and III, this chapter analyzes the post war scenario: whether 
continuing military presence in the civilian arena has enhanced military prerogatives 
detrimental to the consolidation of democracy, and if so, whether these prerogatives have 
jeopardized civilian supremacy and endangered democratic consolidation in Sri Lanka. 
The analysis of Sri Lanka’s post-war military involvement in extra-military roles 
will be based on a theoretical paradigm of Alfred Stepan’s military prerogatives 
described in Chapter II. Further, at the outset it is pertinent to note that engaging the Sri 
Lanka military in extra military roles has been a government initiative and not an 
initiative taken by the military in its own interests.  
Stepan’s first prerogative examines the role played by the military in the political 
system. Although the Sri Lanka military has been engaged in diversified roles in the post-
war reconciliation, the situations discussed in the study clearly indicate that the Sri Lanka 
military has not made any attempt to be involved in the country’s political system. The 
military has maintained its distance, respecting the state bureaucracy managed by the 
political hierarchy and headed by the executive president as commander in chief of the 
armed forces. The political bureaucracy has carefully exercised its command and control 
over the armed forces, maintaining distance between the military and the civilian political 
arena through a comprehensively established and functioning MOD. All military dealings 
with the political hierarchy have been channeled through a well-established MOD, and 
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there is no indication of overstepping of boundaries. Further, the Sri Lanka constitution 
has not left any room for the military to interfere in strategic decision making of the 
country, and abiding by that norm the military has functioned in assigned roles 
satisfactorily without creating any threat to the civilian-led political regime during the 
war and in the post war scenario. The Sri Lanka military that had been fully engaged in 
internal security during the civil war was disengaged along with the removal of 
emergency regulations in the aftermath of the war. The space created in internal security 
responsibilities due to the removal of the military has been filled by the civil police. 
Further, during the short span of four years of post-war reconciliation, the military has 
not taken part in any internal security duties, either on their own or by order of the 
government. Therefore, there has been no opportunity for the military to involve itself in 
the political system as a prerogative. In that category and context the Sri Lanka military 
scores low.    
The second prerogative described by Stepan highlights the military’s relationship 
to the chief executive and refers to de facto control of the military by uniformed, active-
duty, service commanders.181 The type of civil-military relations maintained in the 
country have prevented development of any environment conducive for the military to 
take over the appointment of the commander in chief in Sri Lanka either during the 
intense period of war or in the war’s aftermath. By commencement of the Eelam War IV, 
the national leadership of Sri Lanka had established the necessary mechanism for 
effective management of the military through a clearly defined command structure 
exercised by the executive president through the secretary of defense. The appointment of 
Gotabaya Rajapakse to the highest seat of the MOD as the secretary of defense was a 
decisive and undeniably crucial decision taken by the president for the improvement of 
civil-military relations. Subsequent changes in military hierarchy by the MOD has 
gathered and formed a cohesive group of dedicated top military officers who have been 
subordinated to democratic civilian control throughout the period under review.  
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This becomes evident with the successful termination of the three-decade-long 
war in 2009 under the political leadership of Mahinda Rajapakse. In the post-war 
scenario, a similar kind of legitimate control has been exercised by the GoSL, and the 
study reveals that the MOD in Sri Lanka is a highly empowered institution utilized to 
regulate the military. In that setup, the secretary of defense has performed the role of 
intermediary between the powerful military and the country’s commander-in-chief and 
president, who is popularly elected.   
The opportunity gained by the military through employment in extra-military 
duties has not been detrimental to civilian control in Sri Lanka, and there is no evidence 
to the contrary—of any attempt made by the military to manipulate unwarranted 
influence over civilian control in order to override the supreme command. In the 
structured environment in which the war was conducted and in its aftermath, the 
president as the commander-in-chief has exercised de jure and de facto182 command over 
the military as stipulated in the constitution and has never been challenged by the 
military, though it has been powerful. This is an encouraging situation ideal for 
consolidation of democracy that hardly prevails in most countries. The most recent 
examples in this context are Pakistan and Egypt. Therefore, in this category, too, Sri 
Lanka military scores low on prerogatives.  
The coordination of the defense sector in Sri Lanka may be viewed as an area that 
might generate a moderate prerogative for the military. In a democratic environment, 
coordination of the military is a de jure and de facto task of a cabinet-level civilian officer 
appointed by the executive. In ideal terms, he should manage the military with the 
participation of other professional civil servants.183  
However, in Sri Lanka this highest administrative position at the MOD, which is 
also the nerve center for military control, is held by a retired military officer. Further, few 
MOD positions (not exceeding 15% of the total staff positions) in Sri Lanka are managed 
by retired military and police officers. Hence, there is a strong possibility of creating 
                                                 
182 Ibid., 93–127. 
183 Ibid., 94. 
 74
organizational biases by these officers. Further, in an environment where the military is 
actively involved in tasks other than their primary duty, these officers may manipulate 
situations to their own benefit. Therefore, the presence of even a few numbers of military 
retirees’ at strategic levels of decision making in the MOD might be detrimental to the 
democratic control of the armed forces in the long run.  
Another significant weakness observed in the MOD is the criteria adopted for 
selection of staff officers. As the study reveals, Sri Lanka recruits retired military officers 
to the highest staff positions in the MOD by handpicking, and there is no specific 
standard maintained for recruiting. This is a poor procedure, as no transparency is 
maintained in the process. However, it is observed that a majority of the staff 
appointments are filled by civilian officials who are recruited through the Sri Lanka 
Administrative Service and who take competitive examinations. This is viewed as a 
better arrangement that can strengthen democratic control of the armed forces.  
Further, the presence of a retired military officer in the highest civilian 
administrative position of the MOD, and who is a link to the political sphere, can be 
viewed as a deviation from standard procedure. The study reveals that the role of 
Gotabaya Rajapakse as the Secretary of Defense in Sri Lanka, however, has been highly 
instrumental in winning the war and successfully engaging the armed forces in post-war 
reconciliation and nation-building tasks. Although, this arrangement in Sri Lanka has 
been effective and has not created any threat to democratic control of the armed forces, it 
can only be described as a unique situation accomplished with dedication, a positive 
attitude and the special qualities of an individual. This may not be appropriate as a 
general concept to be applied in a different situation.  
In the Sri Lankan scenario, neither during the civil war nor after the war, has the 
military actively participated in the cabinet. A study of the thirty-year-long war and the 
history before does not reveal any incident of the military taking over cabinet portfolios. 
The cabinet in Sri Lanka, composed of politicians has been under the civilian purview 
without any military influence throughout. Although the military has been engaged in 
extra-military activities in post-war Sri Lanka, no attempt has been made by it—nor have 
there been any opportunities made available for it by the political hierarchy—to intrude 
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in the performance of the cabinet. Therefore, in that sense the Sri Lanka military does not 
present any prerogative detrimental to democratic civilian control and, for that matter, is 
very unlikely to do so in the future.   
Legislative control of the military in Sri Lanka has been established through their 
close supervision of the MOD. The policy issues affecting military budgets, force 
structure, and new weapon systems were favorably handled through a functioning MOD 
to support the war. In the aftermath, the MOD enhanced extra-military roles of 
reconciliation and reconstruction, roles that have been adequately monitored and debated 
in the parliament. Unlike other countries, Sri Lanka has made the leadership of the two 
critical, line ministries involved in the subject area the purview of one individual. The 
president’s holding of the two line ministries—defense and finance—has always helped 
accommodate a priority position when allocating and debating budgets. This arrangement 
has been a government-initiated move rather than a military initiative. The high military 
expenditure (3.7 % of the GDP)184 in post-war Sri Lanka is not an indication of a military 
prerogative. In the long term, however, military involvement in extra-military activities 
related to business ventures may create new problems of corruption and malpractice 
within the military if adequate transparency is not maintained during operations. 
The sixth military prerogative highlighted by Stepan—military influence in the 
role of senior career civil servants or civilian appointees185—becomes null and void in 
the context of Sri Lanka as no active-duty, military officials are present in top, defense-
sector staff roles in the MOD. The very same organizational setup of the security sector 
was maintained during the war, as well as in its aftermath. Although the military has been 
engaged in extended roles of post-war reconciliation—such as demining, resettlement of 
IDP’s, reconstruction of housing, reactivation of farm lands, restoration of roads and 
irrigation projects, reconstruction of railway lines, restoration of civil administration, 
tourism promotion, and the like—no special opportunity has been made available for 
active-duty military officers to influence the top defense management or the executive of 
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the country in Sri Lanka. In addition to the secretary of defense, no civilian or retired or 
active duty military officer has been appointed in the capacity of advisor or assistant to 
the executive, and the defense management of the country has been exclusively handled 
through the MOD. The strictly regulated MOD functions have maintained democratic, 
civilian control of the military, and the welfare-based policies adapted in post-war 
management of the military have resulted in disciplined reciprocation by the military 
rather than its demanding positions in the arena of defense management. This is a classic 
situation the GoSL has achieved which strengthens civil-military relations, leading to 
consolidation of democracy.   
Although it was not discussed in the study, the Sri Lanka military assumed no role 
or influence over the intelligence services. The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) is a 
purely civilian-led institution, and the military has no stake in the management setup of 
the said organization. The only role allocated to the military is feeding the NIB with 
information pertaining to national security. Therefore, the de jure and de facto control of 
the highest intelligence agency in Sri Lanka is handled through civilian chains of 
command and is free from military influence.  
As the thesis highlights, a stark difference in the security organization in Sri 
Lanka is the function of police which fall under the purview of the MOD as in Colombia. 
This is a significant deviation from the commonly accepted practice of democracies. 
However, the MOD has granted adequate structural independence for the police to 
function independently under the Inspector General of Police. Although the Sri Lanka 
Police have been under the administrative control of the MOD, the study reveals that the 
police have been able to reinstate and maintain domestic security at an acceptable level, 
especially after the conclusion of the war. In this background, the military has no 
opportunity to command or intervene in the functions of the police, nor does it assume 
any prerogative reasoning that deters democracy in the country. The strategy adapted in 
Sri Lanka may be successful in the short term, but in the long term it may infringe on the 
free and fair function of the police due to influences that may be created by various 
militaristic approaches followed by a MOD.  
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Promotions within a military in a functioning democracy should take place in a 
highly regulated environment, and the military should not have the prerogative of 
manipulating the promotion process.186 In Sri Lanka, too, a similar regulative 
arrangement has been laid down. The armed services adopt a standard and transparent 
procedure to effect military promotions. In the post-war scenario, although assigned extra 
roles of nation building, the military has adhered to the standard procedures. 
Recommendations for promotions are channeled through the MOD for approval of the 
executive. In that sense, the mechanism for military promotions in Sri Lanka is observed 
as free from influence, leaving no room to gain undue prerogatives. This may be one 
reason, why the Sri Lanka military has remained disciplined and subordinated. Especially 
after the conclusion of the war, maintaining discipline in a large force engaged in duties 
of a non-military nature possess a high probability of inducing coups, but the strongly 
established civil-military relations mechanism in Sri Lanka has prevented such a 
development, one that might endanger consolidation of democracy.   
The military role in state enterprises in Sri Lanka indicates some degree of 
involvement that might enhance military prerogatives. In the Sri Lankan scenario, 
however, the government is following a relatively secure approach and has appointed 
retired military officers instead of reserve or active-duty military officers to high 
positions in the state enterprises. This became apparent in the revamping process of the 
diplomatic corps (discussed in Chapter III), during the periods of the civil-war and post-
war Sri Lanka, as many senior, retired, military officers were appointed as ambassadors.  
This level of military involvement can be identified as an area that might generate 
a moderate level of military prerogative. Further, the military’s successful performance in 
extended roles of post-war reconciliation may influence the government to further 
increase the appointment of officers with military background in additional areas of 
nation building in the future. This might result in reduction and elimination of 
employment opportunities for the civil sector.   
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The Sri Lanka military can be well excluded from the eleventh prerogative 
described by Stepan that specifies the role of the military in a state legal system. As per 
the constitution, the Sri Lanka military comes under the jurisdiction of two courts of law. 
While each armed service is administered under its respective military act (the Army Act, 
Navy Act and the Air Force Act), the services are also subject to the country’s civil law. 
Under no circumstances in the history of Sri Lanka, or during the civil-war or in its 
aftermath, have civilians been brought under the scrutiny of military courts for any 
reason. Further, under no circumstances has the military either rejected or not participated 
in the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and the judiciary has remained free from any 
military influence.  
The Table 1 presents in a summarized format the impact levels of the military 
prerogatives discussed above. For ease in understanding the possible impact levels, the 
prerogatives are listed in four categories based on effect—nil, low, medium and high. 
Overall, the impact of military prerogatives in Sri Lanka demonstrates minimal military 
implications. The impact range remains between nil to low, indicating a conducive 
environment for establishing stable, civil-military relations in the country. 
 
Types of Prerogatives  Possible Effect 
Nil Low Moderate High 
1. Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of 
the military in political system: 
X    
2. Military relationship to the chief executive: X    
3. Coordination of defense:  X   
4. Active-duty military participation in the Cabinet: X    
5. Role of legislature: X    
6. Role of senior career civil servants or civilian 
political appointees: 
 X   
7. Role in intelligence: X    
8. Role in police:  X   
9. Role in military promotions: X    
10. Role in state enterprises:  X   
11. Role in legal system: X    
Table 1.   Prerogatives of Military as an Institution in the Democratic Regime  
in Sri Lanka (After Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 94–127) 
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Fewer military prerogatives in a country denote less contestation between the 
civilians and the military—an ideal situation for democratic consolidation. The study 
proves that Sri Lanka has achieved such stability in civil-military relations through 
implementation of various measures of democratic control that have enhanced 
effectiveness of the military, guiding it to conclude a thirty-year-long war and eradicate 
terrorism from the country. Later, it guided the military in post-war reconciliation and 
nation building with positive results.  
As per the study, it is found that most analyses of civil-military relations assume 
that an armed force strong enough to defend a country is also capable to taking it over. 
(This has been discussed in the review of literature.) Therefore, the fundamental concern 
of civil-military relations has been focused on control. However, a new conceptualization 
of civil-military relations by Bruneau and Matei, on which I base my arguments, focuses 
beyond the aspect of control and looks at effectiveness, considering contemporary 
challenges like terrorism, crime, humanitarian assistance, peace support operations, and 
civil conflicts.   
As Bruneau and Matei suggest in their framework of civil-military relations, 
institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and inculcation of professional norms are 
key considerations in establishing civil-military relations. Institutional control 
mechanisms provide directions and guidelines for the security forces. These include 
organic laws, regulations that empower civilians, and civilian-led organizations with 
professional staff. In that context, the MOD (led by civilians), ministry of interior for 
national police are considered vital. Oversight is the other important factor which allows 
civilians to keep track of the security forces and their performance and to ensure 
guidelines are properly followed. In a democratic environment, the executive, legislative, 
and judiciary branches, as well as independent media and INGO’s are the institutions that 
undertake this task. The professional norms among the security forces are 
institutionalized through recruitment, training, and promotions per the aspirations of 
democratically elected civilian leaders.  
Bruneau and Matei describe effectiveness as the ability and preparedness of 
security forces to fulfill their assigned roles. For security forces to be effective they 
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should have plans, structures, processes, and resources. However, Bruneau and Matei 
believe that measuring effectiveness is a difficult task. The benchmark of effectiveness in 
conducting war, they say, can be considered as equal to winning it. 
The comparison and contrast of measures adopted by Sri Lanka on democratic 
control of civil-military relations using new concepts of Bruneau and Matei highlight 
many similarities as well as some deviations. While following accepted concepts, Sri 
Lanka adopted many deviations in shaping its civil-military relations, deviations that 
proved effective during the war and its aftermath. As the ultimate benchmark of 
effectiveness in conducting the war, the Sri Lanka military has proven itself effective 
winning the civil war and eradicating terrorism. In the post-war scenario, the Sri Lanka 
military has been instrumental in accelerating the reconciliation process and achieving on 
time the development targets set by the political hierarchy.   
Chapter III of the study provides an in depth discussion of strategies adopted in 
establishing institutional control mechanisms. Unlike other countries, Sri Lanka 
introduced substantial changes in the organization of the MOD, effected structural 
changes in the military with uncommon initiatives to coordinate the three forces. The 
present government of Sri Lanka made considerably more effort professionalizing the 
military than any other previous government, moved the ministry of finance to function 
under the purview of the minister of defense, established new guidelines for the role of 
the media, utilized the media to rally public support, and revamped and utilized 
diplomatic prowess to maintain international relations important for conducting military 
operations. These initiatives have proven to be successful in the case of Sri Lanka.  
The oversight function of the military in Sri Lanka has brought about a certain 
degree of success. The MOD mechanisms have maintained strict oversight of functions 
among the services, and an independent body of government auditors was allowed to 
carry out auditing functions. While defense related bills are essentially debated in 
parliament, no significant judicial control is observable. The oversight by media was 
minimal during the time of the war, however, in the post-war period, the media has 
become highly active highlighting the slightest military incident.  
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In contrast to countries like the U.S. and Romania, Sri Lanka needs immediate 
improvement in the aspect of civilian oversight by media and NGOs as the Sri Lanka 
military has undertaken commercial activities that might lead to corruption. In the context 
of professional norms, the study observes the adequate commitment of the Sri Lanka 
military as it has followed democratic procedures in the areas of recruitment, promotions 
and training. Table 2 summarizes the achievement of democratic civilian control and 
effectiveness in Sri Lanka in two different scenarios—during the civil war and after the 
civil war. The table indicates almost similar status in both scenarios except for resources, 
which indicate a reduction, and for improvement of oversight, which is due to media 
activity in the post-war era. However, as has been highlighted earlier, Sri Lanka needs 
further improvement in the oversight mechanism due to current commitments of the 




relations   














High High High Medium/ 
High 
Post-war  High Medium High High High Medium 
Table 2.   Requirements for Achieving Democratic Civilian Control and Effectiveness 
(After Bruneau and Matei, The Routledge Handbook, 2013, 345) 
In this context, Sri Lanka provides a proven case study for the new 
conceptualization of civil-military relations introduced by Bruneau and Matei, a modified 
idea of democratic control and effectiveness of the military in civil-military relations for 
countries affected with modern threats like terrorism and organized crime.187 
                                                 
187 Bruneau and Matei, The Routledge Handbook, 26.  
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Furthermore, in regard to the establishment of civil-military relations in such a 
country, this study recognizes the intense contribution the national leadership made in 
key areas of reorganizing the defense apparatus, in decision making under international 
pressure, in gaining public awareness to support the military effort, and in encouraging 
patriotic youth to join the armed forces. All these have contributed to a positive impact in 
civil-military relations during and after the war. Compared to the leaders of other 
countries, President Rajapakse as the Commander-in-Chief performed the roles of both 
Minister of Defense and the Minister of Finance, and this combination eliminated 
unnecessary bureaucratic delays in funding the military—conserving crucial logistic 
functions, maintaining the costly delivery platforms and, above all, increasing manpower 
and sustaining training cycles. It is to note that scholars have limited themselves only to 
drawing examples from aspects like national leadership, commitment, and patriotism of 
the highest level of the command relevant to the effectiveness of the military rather than 
discussing those in length. In that background, the Sri Lankan incident proves that, not 
only institutional changes ensure civil-military relations.  
In the aftermath of war, the GoSL adopted similar strategies with a more 
incentive-based approach to guide the military. However, it has changed roles to an extra-
military nature supporting post-war reconciliation and consolidation of democracy in the 
country. While arguments have been made about utilization of the military in extended 
roles by the GoSL,  causing excessive militarization (as elaborated in chapter I), the study 
proves that the roles performed by the Sri Lanka military during the post-war period have 
not created any impact leading to excessive militarization. Analysis of the prerogatives of 
the Sri Lanka military, set beside Stepan’s elaborations on military prerogatives, clears 
this doubt comprehensively.   
Samuel E. Finer describes modern armies as a microcosm of the state,188 capable 
of supporting primitive economies and even more developed economies and accelerating 
                                                 
188 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 15.       
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their development. He provides examples such as Brazil and Argentina.189 In that sense, 
engaging the Sri Lanka military in extra roles in the interest of reconciliation and 
reconstruction; resettlement of IDP’s; rehabilitation and reintegration of former LTTE 
combatants into the society; humanitarian demining; infrastructure facilities rebuilding; 
agriculture farming; and hotel management can also be categorized as endeavors of 
national interests similar to that of Argentina and Brazil. These projects have been 
implemented for nation building and have not endangered democratic consolidation of 
the country. 
Although the accomplishments of the government attained by guiding the military 
to win the war and by utilizing it for post-war reconciliation and nation building reflects 
an established civil-military mechanism in the country, the extended roles of the post-war 
military might raise serious questions of corruption in the long run. The military has 
always been an institution oriented towards engaging in war or other national-security 
related roles and missions,190 not an organization geared to undertake business. In that 
context, the study of new strategies adopted in civil-military relations in Sri Lanka, 
whereby the military performs an extra role, may not grasp any apparatus introduced to 
minimize possible post-war corruption. This stands as a critical weakness in the post-war, 
civil-military relations mechanism in a country where the military is extensively engaged 
in commercial activities.   
In the analysis of military prerogatives, new strategies of civil-military relations, 
extra roles of the military, and the weakness of CMR strategy in post-war scenario, it is 
important to ascertain the impacts of the Sri Lanka military on consolidation of 
democracy in the aftermath of the war. In using Linz and Stepan’s five arenas of 
consolidation of democracy191 described in Chapter II, the military in Sri Lanka does not 
present any threat to post-war consolidation of democracy. Rather than posing a threat to 
the consolidation effort, the study identifies that the military has strengthened the 
                                                 
189 In Brazil, the army has explored the interior, set up telegraph and wireless stations, developed 
agricultural colonies and engaged in educating the Indians. In Argentina, the military is involved in 
construction of roads, schools, and hospitals, and has some stake in the domestic oil industry, Ibid.    
190 Bruneau and Matei, The Routledge Handbook, 26–29. 
191 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation, 7. 
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democratization process by maintaining minimum prerogatives. By winning the war, the 
military has reinstated the freedom of the society; hence, it has not intervened in any 
political process in the country or disturbed political parties from functioning freely. 
As the study highlights, the government itself popularized the military in the 
country during the war and in the post-war period, and as a result, the respect and 
affection of the general public towards the military has gone up and stayed four years 
after the war has ended. Maybe due to this reason, no significant interest has been taken 
by the general society to criticize the military. Society has viewed the military as a 
credible organization compared to all other government institutions. In this situation, the 
study could not identify the existence of any oversight function exercised by the civil 
society. Further, as Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmonds, and Anthony Forster identified in 
Bulgaria,192 in Sri Lanka it is not due to the ignorance of the population and society that 
there is no watchdog function. However, the lack of such a function in the post-war 
environment might be advantageous for the military allowing it to cover shortcomings 
that occur while engaging in commercial activities.                               
In Sri Lanka, under a powerful executive and legislature, the military has not 
expanded any prerogative detrimental to the rule of law of the country, and the study 
confirms that the military in Sri Lanka has respected the law of the country while 
remaining equally subordinate to military law. No conflict has occurred between the 
military and the civilian political leadership, especially in the post-war period, and it 
stands as a good testimony to the discipline of the Sri Lanka military. Although the 
military has engaged in post-war reconciliation tasks involving various civilian 
organizations, it has not created any threat to bureaucratic functions led by civilian 
leaders, and the composite outcome of the five arenas of consolidation of democracy 
described by Linz and Stepan.   
Table 3 summarizes data extracted from three years of annual reports of the EIU, 
indicating how Sri Lanka has maintained democracy during the periods of civil war 
                                                 
192 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmonds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: 
Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and the Society, Vol 29,  Fall 2002, 
accessed on February 07, 2013. http://afs.sagepub.com/content/29/1/31.full.pdf+html. 
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(2008) and in the aftermath of the war (2010 and 2011.) It indicates significant 
improvement in the area of functioning government. In other areas of concern, Sri Lanka 
has survived and maintained the same levels, and not deteriorated. Although, no indicator 
identifies military influence, the said indicators may represent direct effects of military 
initiatives. In that context, I utilize the said data to conclude that post-war engagement of 
the military in Sri Lanka has not endangered democratic consolidation. On the contrary, 
Freedom House in its 2013 annual report has categorized Sri Lanka as a “partly free 
country,” indicating a decline193 of democracy. However, Freedom House utilizes only 
two types of data—political rights and civil liberty—in its surveys, so its conclusions 
need further clarification.       



















2008 7.42 4.64 5.56 7.5 7.94 6.61 57 
2009                                             Data not available 
2010 7.00 6.07 5.0 6.88 8.24 6.64 55 
2011 7.00 6.07 5.0 6.88 7.94 6.58 57 
2012                                             Data not available 
Table 3.   Statistics of Freedom in Sri Lanka (After Freedom in the World 2013,  
Freedom House) 
Further, the analysis of the case of Sri Lanka draws attention to areas of 
importance which have not been examined by past scholars in their studies. One such 
factor is the impact of national leadership on civil-military relations. In Sri Lanka, the 
president, as the national leader and the commander in chief of the armed forces, has 
displayed exceptional patriotism in saving the country. Such exemplary attitude of the 
                                                 
193 Sri Lanka received a downward trend due to evidence of increasing corruption and a politicized 
attempt to impeach the chief justice of the Supreme Court. “Freedom in the World,” Freedom House, 
accessed on February 7, 2013. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet.pdf. 
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national leader has generated patriotism among the armed forces in Sri Lanka. While 
most political leaders around the world fear popularizing and recognizing the military as 
defenders of a nation, President Rajapakse made a great effort to uplift the image of the 
military, to establish democratic control through proper institutionalism, and to guide the 
military in winning a war and uniting the country. 
In the aftermath, in an established civil-military relations environment, utilization 
of the military in an extended role has resulted in rapid development, and it has become 
the driving factor of post-war reconciliation and nation building in Sri Lanka, supporting 





This thesis looked at engaging the military in post-war reconciliation in Sri Lanka 
and its implications for consolidation of democracy in the country. In the beginning, it 
reviews the existing literature on the subject focusing on different regions of the world. 
Having reviewed the literature, the thesis next introduces the necessary theoretical 
background relevant to the study, then discusses the case of Sri Lanka—concentrating on 
the war and post-war scenario. Next, it analyzes the case of Sri Lanka in order to find 
implications for consolidation of democracy in the light of engaging the military in post-
war reconciliation. In conclusion, the study finds that the state of democratic, civil-
military relations maintained in the country has inspired the military to subordinate itself 
to civilian supremacy, perform new roles, and be the driving factor of post-war 
reconciliation of the country. 
First, Sri Lanka faced one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations in the world. 
The civil war in Sri Lanka was the longest fought civil war in the South Asian Region. 
The conflict dragged on for almost three decades under many national leaders and, while 
the country was undergoing a period of turmoil, Mahinda Rajapakse assumed the 
presidency. As an agile leader, he was able to establish democratic civilian control, 
transform a demoralized military into a military with a winning strategy, and guide it to 
unite the country under one national flag, defeating the LTTE.   
 Second, President Rajapakse’s approach towards finding a solution has been 
radical and pragmatic, and his solution to the long, drawn-conflict was militaristic. To 
make war, he realized the necessity of building a strong military and controlling and 
guiding it towards the accomplishment of the goal. His government introduced radical 
changes in the management system of the country’s military through major revamps in 
the MOD, the military structure, and other essential areas that supported the war. Further, 
the national leadership instilled patriotism among the military and created a national will 
among the general public, through which Rajapakse was able to coherently improve civil-
military relations in the country. Finally, after establishing strong civil-military relations,  
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the GoSL was able to guide the military in winning the war against the LTTE, proving 
the valuable though debatable thought once made by scholar Edward N. Luttwack: “make 
war to make peace.”194 
 Third, this thesis finds that in the aftermath of the war the GoSL tactfully 
managed civil-military relations in the country, realizing that the military is a cohesive 
entity of power. Instead of adopting a brutal fiscal approach—cutting budgets, reducing 
wartime concessions and downsizing the military—the GoSL has adopted a strategy of 
establishing controls and utilizing the enlarged military for post-war reconciliation and 
nation building. Further, instead of claiming credit for ending the war, the government 
gave full credit to the military for its patriotic dedication to the country. That increased 
the respect and loyalty of the armed forces towards the government multifold with no 
prerogative detrimental to democratic control. 
Fourth, the thesis finds that, after concluding the war the GoSL did not hesitate to 
employ the military in changed roles to accomplish post-war reconciliation and nation 
building in a wide scope of tasks while ensuring democratic civilian control over the 
military. Instead of reducing military privileges in its incentive-based approach, the 
government granted more welfare to the military—especially to uplift the social 
standards of the poor foot soldier who played a key role in the battle. The government has 
also made a dedicated attempt to take care of thousands of disabled war heroes through 
various rehabilitation projects that have captured the attention and sincere appreciation of 
the military—enhancing military subordination to civilian control. In this context, the 
extended roles assigned it have been highly welcomed by the military without hesitation 
and, during the short spell of three years since the war ended, the military along with the 
government has been able to make a substantial contribution in many areas of critical 
importance, accelerating the post-war stabilization and consolidation of democracy in the 
country.   
 
                                                 
194 Edward N. Luttwack, Give War a Chance, (Centre for International Strategic Studies: 1999), 
accessed on September 12, 2012. http://www.scribd.com/doc/7258092/Luttwak-Give-War-a-Chance. 
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Under these circumstances, the thesis finds that, in using Stepan’s military 
prerogatives, the Sri Lanka military had created few or no prerogatives detrimental to 
civilian control or effectiveness while enhancing civil-military relations and democratic 
consolidation of the country. In this context, the heavy presence of the Sri Lanka military 
in post-war reconciliation and nation building has not created any negative impact on 
civil-military relations and the consolidation of democracy in Sri Lanka. This is 
illustrated in the democracy index-2011 published by the Economic Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) where Sri Lanka occupies the position 57195 in world ranking, ahead of democratic 
countries like Romania and many other prominent nations.  
The case of Sri Lanka is unique, as measures adapted to effect democratic civilian 
control of the military are different from the most common approaches based on 
controlling the military used by well-established countries. Although the initiatives of the 
government have been successful, they may be strictly dependent on current political 
leadership and prove to be fragile in changed circumstances. However, the experience in 
Sri Lanka proves the importance and effectiveness of civil-military relations in winning 
wars and dealing with post-war democratization challenges.  
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